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Abstract
This thesis tries to explore the relationship between the banking sector and the aggregate 
economy from three aspects. Chapter one addresses the relationship between financial 
frictions and the banking sector profit maximization behaviour. Financial frictions stem from 
the managerial cost associated with intermediation process, factor payments to collateral and 
labour services. The stake of entrepreneurs is relevant to determine the EFP on two grounds: 
(i) the ratio of entrepreneurial net wealth to collateral value influences the total managerial 
cost; (ii) entrepreneurs’ holding of collateral help mitigate the EFP from the return on 
collateral.
Chapter two focuses on the role of supply side disturbance in financial market in shaping the 
business cycle. Specifically, I generate a DSGE model with a profit maximizing banking 
sector that predicts a relationship between EFP and corporate balance sheet condition as well 
as factor price. The shock to the loan productivity and the entrepreneurial net wealth 
resemble the supply and demand disturbances in financial markets. Constructed shock shows 
that every post war recession is crashed with the situation that both the two financial shocks 
are in contraction. The variance decomposition exercise indicates that the loan productivity 
shock is a very important source of EFP variation, though playing a minor role in determining 
the rest of the economy.
Chapter three incorporates the bank capital into financial friction analysis. Bank capital is 
important because it is assumed to be one of the three factors to produce entrepreneurial loans. 
In consequence, the financial friction is shown to depend on the corporate balance sheet 
condition, the bank capital ratio, and the liquidity premium. Thus I am able to establish the 
link between the bank capital channel and the model’s transmission mechanism subject to 
exogenous shocks. The results indicate that an active bank capital channel amplifies the 
monetary policy shocks (demand) while attenuates the technology shocks (supply) when 
households’ deposit is contracted in nominal term (‘Fisher deflation effect’). It is also shown 
that adverse shocks to bank capital value can lead to sizeable declines in bank lending and 
economic recession.
/
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1Chapter 1
Collateral, Loan Production and Banking 
Accelerator
21.1 Introduction
Based on Modigliani-Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance theorem, mainstream macro- 
economic approaches have long ignored the relevance of financial sector to real economic 
outcomes1. Nonetheless, more and more empirical evidences, especially the recent macro- 
economic events (2008-2010), have sparked renewed interest in the role of financial factors 
in the business cycle research. This chapter adds to this research agenda by incorporating a 
financial intermediary problem into an otherwise standard Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model. The goal is to address the importance of financial factors in 
business cycle analysis.
It is important to understand two distinct concepts on the effect of the financial frictions on 
aggregate fluctuations before we move further. The first concept is financial frictions, which 
is a channel where different shocks are propagated to the rest of the economy and as a result 
the effects could be amplified or attenuated given its presence. The second concept is 
financial disturbances, which is a shock directly originated in the financial sector of the 
economy and has the potential to impact the rest of the variables in the economy. This 
chapter mainly deals with the first concept while the second concept is left to the following 
chapter.
This chapter studies the interaction of financial frictions and business cycle in a simple 
extension of the standard DSGE model. For this purpose, I develop a model that distinguishes 
households and entrepreneurs in order to motivate lending and borrowing in equilibrium. 
Financial intermediaries (FIs) exist because they transfer funds from household sector 
(lenders) to entrepreneurial sector (borrowers). Inspired by a recent paper of Goodfriend and 
McCallum (2007), I assume that the FIs have access to an explicit loan production function 
that requires collateral and labour services. There are two advantages for this setup. First, this 
assumption precludes the possibility that entrepreneurs borrow funds directly from 
households. Because households do not have access to the loan management technology, it is
1 Real business cycle (RBC) model and, more recently, the new neoclassical synthesis (NNS) model are both 
silent about financial relevance. See King and Rebelo (1999) for a detailed exposition of RBC framework and 
Christiano et al. (2005) for NNS.
3too costly to conduct direct lending; they delegate monitoring to FIs. Second, this is a model 
device that can help derive financial frictions easily with first principles. FIs are owned by 
households and try to maximize their value subject to the loan production function. The 
financial frictions stem from the cost associated with loan management.
In the baseline model, financial friction manifests itself as the wedge between the interest rate 
charged on entrepreneurial loans and the interest rate received on households’ deposits. The 
interest differential is used to pay for the cost of loan management: collateral and labour 
monitoring services. Entrepreneurs need the external funds (loans) to invest in physical 
capital because they are not able to fully finance with internal funds only. In equilibrium, the 
borrowing is stopped when the return on capital is equal to the cost o f external funds: loan 
interest rate. Compared to those in a frictionless world, the return on capital is higher and the 
long-run capital and output level are lower in the model with financial frictions. While in the 
short-run, dynamic in the baseline model also distinguishes itself from that in frictionless 
model for endogenous essence of the interest rate wedge; in macroeconomic jargon, the 
external finance premium (EFP).
The endogeneity of EFP in the baseline model is determined by the following mechanism. In 
the model, loan is supplied according to the loan production function, which needs labour 
monitoring and collateral service. Thus for a given level of labour effort, higher collateral 
value will either boom the loan supply or reduce the cost of loan production; there is a 
downward pressure on EFP. This conforms well to the economic expansion when asset prices 
are surging. On the other hand, however, the economic boom also encourages entrepreneurs 
to invest more. This perhaps drives up the demand for external funds as well, depending on 
the strength of internal funds relative to total demand of capital. For a given level of labour 
monitoring, higher loan demand has the potential to push up EFP. The question is which one 
is stronger. In economic upturns, if loan demand increases more than supply boom in the 
credit market, the cost of loan production still surges in the economic expansion. So does the 
EFP. If loan demand increases less or even decreases for the strong upward movement of 
entrepreneurial net wealth, EFP tends to decline. For the reason above, in the short-run, the 
mechanism can either accelerate or decelerate the economy subject to other shocks, 
depending on whether the loan supply or demand boom dominates.
4This modelling strategy is motivated along with the recent development of incorporating 
financial frictions into macroeconomic analysis. Several theoretical claims have been made in 
this line to rationalize the important role of financial frictions in business cycle fluctuations. 
One early important attempt in general equilibrium environment is offered by Bemanke and 
Gertler (1989), where they build on Townsend (1979) costly state verification (CSV) model 
and show that the presence of asymmetric information and agency costs in credit markets can 
give the balance sheet conditions of borrowers a role to play in the business cycle through 
their impact on the cost of external finance. Specifically, the pro-cyclical nature of net worth 
leads the EFP to fall during economic expansions and to rise during recessions. This can be 
nontrivial because these agency problems arise in a setting where the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem does not hold any more. An important insight of Bemanke and Gertler’s framework 
is the theoretical possibility, in qualitative perspective, that financial frictions led by agency 
cost would enhance the propagation of other underlying exogenous shocks. Carlstrom and 
Fuerst (1997) afterward demonstrate the quantitative importance of Bemanke and Gertler 
(1989) mechanism, finding that it could affect an otherwise standard model’s transmission 
mechanism confronting structure shocks (e.g., producing a hump-shaped impulse response 
for output in an otherwise standard RBC model).
Another framework of credit market imperfections is initiated by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
in which they assume an environment with ex post renegotiation and the inalienability of 
human capital. This line of research introduces financial frictions on the quantity side of 
credit via collateral constraints to borrowers. One implication of this assumption is that 
borrowing is so tightly constrained by the level of collateral that default never occurs in 
equilibrium. This framework is recently developed by Iacoviello (2005), who introduces
I
housing as collateral, and by Gerali et al. (2010), who embed monopolistically competitive 
banking sector in the collateral constraints environment.
Among others, one of the most notable settings of financial frictions is derived by Bemanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), BGG hereafter, where they embed a principle-agent problem 
between entrepreneurs (borrowers) and financial intermediaries (lenders) into a standard NNS 
framework. In line with the literature focusing on the price of external funds, as in Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989), BGG incorporates credit market imperfections through the assumption of
5asymmetric information between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries and costly state 
verification of entrepreneurial private return. Entrepreneurial internal funds help mitigate the 
principle-agent problem. The more of entrepreneurial net worth used in production, the less is 
the risk of bankruptcy and the cost of state verification. Thus the price of external funds 
relative to that of internal funds, the EFP, depends inversely on the value of entrepreneurial 
net worth that is in stake. Procyclical movements in entrepreneurial net wealth tend to cause 
countercyclical movements in the EFP, enlarging the volatility of entrepreneurs’ investment 
on the one hand, and amplifying the aggregate fluctuations on the other. This mechanism 
generates the so called “financial accelerator” from the demand side of credit market, and 
becomes wide-spread in the literature while many studies during 2000s incorporate this type 
of friction into DSGE models2.
As is well-known, a key finding of the financial accelerator mechanism from BGG is the 
derivation of the aggregate reduced form relationship between the dynamic behaviour of EFP 
and the ratio of entrepreneurial net worth to total value of purchased capital3. The foundation 
of this relationship stems from an optimal contracting problem between the entrepreneurs and 
financial intermediaries. Since the return on capital is subject to idiosyncratic shock, each 
entrepreneur has no choice but default when hit by large negative shock. In this case, 
financial intermediaries can disclose the actual return of default entrepreneurs on the cost of 
losing fraction as auditing cost. In order to account for the risk of defaulting and monitoring 
cost ex post, financial intermediaries charge the loan a premium on top of the cost of deposit 
funds. The lower is the entrepreneurs’ own net worth relative to the value of capital (higher 
leverage), the higher is the probability of insolvency and default, and the higher is the EFP.
This leads to a further decline of entrepreneurial net worth the next period as well as another
\
increase of the EFP, shaping the corresponding propagation mechanism.
2 Christiano et al. (2003) incorporate financial frictions in their model to analyse the Great Depression in US. 
Gertler et al. (2007) elaborate the relevance of the financial accelerator in open economy crisis episodes. Meier 
and Muller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008) and Queijo (2009) use the friction underlying the financial 
accelerator to study differences in the transmission of a number of structural shocks.
3 BGG originally incorporates a standard optimal contracting problem between entrepreneurs and financial 
intermediaries that maximize entrepreneurial profit subject to the condition that financial intermediaries earn a 
return equal to risk-free rate with certainty. The external finance premium stems from the monitoring cost. 
Subsequent studies reduce this financial friction to the elasticity of the external finance premium with respect 
to the change in the leverage position of entrepreneurs (e.g., Meier and Muller (2006)).
6The effect on EFP from the balance sheet condition of borrowers as a way of thinking about 
credit market imperfections is well developed and accepted in the literature. Despite the 
widespread usage, there are still some reasons that the financial accelerator framework of 
BGG is subject to unease. A prominent one among these is the absence of an explicit problem 
or role for this passive financial intermediary or banking sector, which behaves only as a veil. 
In this way the financial frictions within the banking sector is ignored completely. Bank’s 
balance sheet condition can be one resolution and motivates some studies seeking to link the 
financial structure of banks to either the price or the quantity (or both) of external funds so as 
to emphasize the role of bank capital in the transmission mechanism. See Drumond (2009) 
for an extensive survey on this on the one hand, and the third chapter of this thesis for a novel 
exposition on the other. On the other hand, the monitoring cost in BGG is treated as a 
deadweight loss measured in consumption goods, for which we have no idea how and where 
this cost is distributed explicitly4. This ad hoc assumption can be avoided if we consider the 
financial frictions generated in the model developed in this chapter.
This chapter introduces an alternative framework that can resemble BGG outcome in the end, 
at the same time overcome the possible unease discussed above5. In the model, EFP is 
endogenously determined in an environment where banks maximize their market value 
subject to loan management technology that relies upon collateral evaluation and labour 
monitoring; addressing the first point. In consequence, financial frictions in this environment 
stem from the managerial cost associated with intermediation process, which are the factor 
payments to collateral service and labour monitoring; addressing the third point. As long as 
the entrepreneurial sector holds fraction of the collateral value, the net wealth, along with 
borrowing, the return on collateral service distributed to the entrepreneurial sector can 
mitigate the EFP paid to banks. As shown below, this assumption leads to a similar derivation 
of the reduced-form relationship between EFP and entrepreneurial leverage position as in 
BGG. Instead of assuming default risk and asymmetric information, this approach provides a
4 BGG also point out their model’s limitation that is complementary to the issues raised here. I also account for 
the possible debt-deflation effect, raised by them, by assuming a nominal debt in the economy.
51 do not make any attempt to claim that there is any blemish in BGG framework per se. The model exposited in 
this chapter is considered as a complement to BGG that provides an alternative way to understand financial 
frictions.
7different angle to understand the financial friction and its impact on the real economy6. This 
“loan production/management” framework also provides a fully micro-founded profit 
maximization problem of banks. If modelled consistently, this framework can be shown as a 
prominent complement of the BGG financial accelerator mechanism7.
The main contribution of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First of all, the model 
constructed with first principle in all sectors resembles the amplification and propagation 
mechanism a la BGG. This promising result helps us understand the credit market imper­
fection from a different perspective of managerial cost in intermediation process. Moreover, 
the effect of Fisher’s Debt Deflation hypothesis is also examined, from which we find that 
financial friction turns to accelerate demand shock while decelerate supply shock in the 
environment of nominal contract. Thirdly, labour monitoring effort, besides collateral, is 
essential in loan management, so the dynamic of EFP in current model also depends on factor 
price of banking labour, which is missing from BGG and many other studies of financial 
frictions. This additional connection from the supply side of credit market introduces extra 
mechanism to influence the dynamics of EFP on top of the part that is related to borrower’s 
balance sheet only, and also the transmission of shocks to the whole economy.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model setup. It 
starts with the problem of banking sector and then incorporates it into the standard DSGE 
framework. Section 1.3 defines the model’s competitive equilibrium, steady states and log- 
linear approximation. Section 1.4 calibrates the model and presents the numerical results. 
Section 1.5 concludes with some final remarks.
1.2 The model
The baseline model shares several features with the original BGG setup and also extends the 
framework along several dimensions. The ingredients I share with BGG are as follows: (i) I 
distinguish between households and entrepreneurs to motivate equilibrium lending and
6 It is fair to claim that since the functional form of loan production contains collateral, motivated by the 
assumption of possible default by entrepreneurs, it is not completely different from BGG.
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) use this model mainly in exploring the role of monetary aggregates and 
financial intermediation for policy decision, but didn’t compare it with BGG’s framework in a consistent and 
rigorous fashion.
/
8borrowing behaviour; (ii) Capital producers are introduced to capture the movement of asset 
price; (iii) Retailers are included as a convenient way to model price stickiness. My extension 
comprises the following things: (1) Households’ wage setting is introduced to better capture 
the movement of real wage, which is part of my financial accelerator mechanism; (2) 
Households and financial intermediaries (FIs) sign contract in nominal terms to motivate the 
debt-deflation effect in the spirit o f Fisher (1933); (3) Most importantly, I replace the BGG’s 
original risky debt contract problem between entrepreneurs and FIs with a contract monitored
by a loan production/management technology a la Goodfiriend and McCallum (2007). As
/
shown below, this framework introduces financial frictions from a different perspective. By 
and large, the baseline model economy includes households, entrepreneurs as wholesale good 
producers, financial intermediaries/banks, capital producers, retailers as final good producers 
and a government. Their behaviours are described explicitly one after another.
1.2.1 Financial intermediaries
In the baseline model, the key ingredient which derives financial frictions that influence the 
transmission mechanism of the model subject to structural shocks is the problem of financial 
intermediaries (FIs). FIs are owned by households and conduct the main activity of issuing 
time deposit to collect funds from households in order to finance the lending to entrepreneurs 
in a perfectly competitive environment. Here I assume the homogeneity of FIs and absence of 
interbank market for convenience because I only need to track the behaviour of the banking 
sector in aggregate sense. Also for convenience, reserve requirement is also ignored from the 
analysis. This can be understood by realising the fact that, as the development of financial 
markets, financial intermediaries recently and nowadays have easy access to sources of funds 
that are not subject to reserve requirement. Thus the balance sheet constraint for FIs is simply
L,<D,; (1.1)
where L, stands for loan and D, for deposit. So long as the interest rate on loan is positive, all 
available funds will be lent out to firms and balance sheet constraint will hold with equality.
9Inspired by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), the volume of loan supply (equivalent as the 
demand for deposit funds) is designed to be determined by a model of loan production, or 
more accurate, loan management, which is involved with collateral assessment and labour 
monitoring. Effort is more productive in making loans the greater is the collateral value. 
Collateral is a valuable input in loan production because it enables FIs to enforce the 
repayment of loans with less monitoring and management effort. FIs expend effort and 
require collateral but in equilibrium there is no default. This modelling choice is based on the 
progress along several dimensions that has been made in understanding the implications of 
credit market imperfections in limited commitment environments where there is no 
equilibrium default8, by contrast to the modelling choice of BGG where the authors develop 
an environment in which default exists in equilibrium because of independent idiosyncratic 
shocks to entrepreneurial (borrower) sector. The specification of loan production function is 
in Cobb-Douglas fashion as follows
L,+i = F, (Q,Km ) r N ; (1.2)
where Ll+l is the amount of loan issued for period r + 1 determined at the end of period t . Qt 
is the capital price in period t , thus Q,Kt+i is the collateral value at the end of time t . jV,F is 
the labour effort involved in loan monitoring, and y  denotes for the share of collateral in loan 
production. Ft represents productivity in loan production to capture the exogenous factor 
other than collateral value and labour monitoring, following AR(1) process in logarithm:
\nF,={\-pf )\aF+pf \aF^+sfl-, (1.3)
with p f  e  (0,1), £„ ~  iid(0, a l ) . It follows the informational and technological advances 
in the banking sector measured as the total factor productivity in the intermediation process 
(e.g., Berger 2003). It is noteworthy that Eq. (1.2) distinguishes itself to the original setting in 
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) in which both capital and government bond are used as 
collateral for loan production. The reasons of excluding bond are twofold. First, government 
bond is not necessary here since the model refrains from the analysis o f it; the omission is a
8 FIs expend effort and require borrowers to post collateral, but in equilibrium there is no default. See 
Kocherlakota (1996), Hart and Moore (1998), and more recently Jermann and Quadrini (2009).
10
simplification. Moreover, to resemble BGG’s expression of financial friction (shown below), 
it is more appropriate to exclude bond from the loan production function. Nevertheless, the 
inclusion of government bond would be straightforward.
section, entrepreneurs obtain the loan to finance the purchase of next period capital in excess 
of their equity (net worth) NWl+l:
Eq. (1.2) and (1.4) together characterize the equilibrium in credit markets.
We can consider the FIs’ problem in the following sense. In marginal perspective, every unit
managerial cost of intermediation for paying the collateral and labour service fees; (2) the
cover the cost of both the two parts; and the credit spread, the difference between interest
and gross interest payment on existing loans, less the labour cost for monitoring, cost of 
collateral service, the new issuing loans and the gross interest payment on existing deposits. 
The FI chooses the collateral service QtK t+i, labour monitoring effort N f  and newly issued 
loan and deposit Dt+1 to maximize the expected life-time value in favour of the bank 
owners, households. The profit maximization problem of the bank is given by
In the demand side of the credit market on the other hand, as described in the following
(1.4)
of loan is issued by equalizing the interest rate to cost. The cost consists of two parts: (1) the
interest rate on deposit as the cost of funds. Thus the interest rate on loans would be set to
rates on loan and that on deposit, is just the managerial cost. We can derive this relationship 
formally in FIs’ maximization problem.
The flow of funds of the typical FI at the end of period t is the new arriving deposit funds
{Qt+hKl+k+l >NI+h »£/+*+1 >Dt+1}
max E ^ P h- f r { D , ^  + O h *  -  -  K A
Wn-h-Alth-t rilh-lQl*h-Al*h}
11
subject to the FI’s balance sheet constraint (1.1) and loan production function (1.2), where 
Ph Ua+h/Uct 1S ^ e  household’s stochastic discount factor9. The first order conditions (F.O.Cs) 
for this optimization problem are:
(1-5)
/  A+i /  Qt^t+\
• =  ( 1 - 6 )
Eq. (1.5) and Eq. (1.6) apply the usual Baumal (1952) conditions, which equalize the credit 
spread of intermediation to the factor prices of inputs divided by the marginal product of the 
inputs. As highlighted in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), this intermediation cost captures 
the idealized net uncollateralized external finance premium (UEFP) in the model, under the 
condition that entrepreneurs come to the bank for borrowing without posting any collateral. 
Thus entrepreneurs have to pay full cost of intermediation: labour monitoring plus collateral 
service. The mathematical expression of UEFP is as follows.
( L 7 )
Unanimously, the above is only one extreme case of the situation. In the other extreme, if 
entrepreneurs possess the full amount of collateral to borrow, they pay the full cost, but get 
back the total return on collateral services at the same time. Therefore, the net EFP for 
entrepreneurs is only the labour monitoring cost, which is the fraction 1 -  y  of the total cost. 
This is defined as the fully collateralized external finance premium (CEFP) in the model 
bconomy, represented as:
CEFPt+l -  1 = — —r
L j N f ; (L8)
In reality, the actual amount of EFP lies between UEFP and CEFP, since entrepreneurs own 
fraction of the total collateral value in the whole economy, given by NWt+l/QtKl+l . The
9 See next section for the households’ problem.
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service return on the part of collateral owned by entrepreneurs help mitigate the practical 
EFP, which is determined by the following ratio:
N W
EFP„X - 1  = E,{R'm  -  < , }  = (UEFPHl - 1)[1 -  r - f - } ; (1.9)
Eq. (1.9) states that the practical EFP is determined by the UEFP discounted by the fraction 
of collateral service in loan production and the share of collateral owned by entrepreneurial 
sector. Thus for a given level of UEFP, the higher is the share of collateral owned by 
entrepreneurial sector, the smaller is EFP. After paying the part of collateral service to 
entrepreneurs, the rest is collected by FIs, the temporary owner of deposit in the interme­
diation process, but finally distributed back to households as dividend. The next task is to 
exposit how UEFP is determined in the intermediation process, corresponding to financial 
sector productivity, factor price of labour and the entrepreneurial net worth collateral ratio.
For a detailed exposition, let’s rewrite the loan production function of Eq. (1.2) by dividing 
both of the two sides with the collateral value Q,Klfl:
L t+i _  F
Q ,K t +1
n ;
Q,K
1 - Y
(1.2’)
/+i y
Eq. (1.2’) reveals a very important property of the assumed loan production function: since 
the ratio of loan to collateral value is a decreasing return to scale (DRS) function to the ratio 
of labour monitoring to collateral value, the marginal cost (UEFP) of loan production would 
be an increasing function to the ratio of loan to collateral, and convex if the loan production is 
collateral intensive {y>  0.5). In other words, UEFP is a decreasing function to the ratio of 
entrepreneurial internal funds (net worth) to total collateral value. To elaborate this property, 
it is necessary to derive UEFP as a function of the ratio of entrepreneurial net worth to 
collateral value NWt+x/Q,K,+l as follbws:
N,
w. —  1 /  \ —f  a t w  \ \ - r
u efpm  - i = — - = - L ^  %  
( i ( i - r ) - ^  1 _ r
; (1-10)
K  Q A /+i
/
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Combine Eq. (1.9) and Eq. (1.10), after some rearrangements, we get
l _ r
EFP,, i - l  =
Eq. (1.11) highlights the key relationship between EFP and the ratio of entrepreneurial 
internal funds to collateral (or purchased capital) value, NWt+j Q tKt+x, derived from the FI’s 
optimization behaviour. Given that Ft and wt are exogenous, we can reach the following 
proposition:
Proposition 1.1: Assume Ft and wt are exogenously give in equilibrium, external finance 
premium is a decreasing and convex function o f  the ratio o f  net worth to 
purchased capital value (collateral value) i f  y>  0.5.
See Appendix B for the proof of proposition 1.1. This proposition implies a very important 
inference: The external finance premium is higher the more entrepreneurs rely on the external 
funds. Figure 1.1 plots the gross EFP against the ratio of net worth to the value of purchased 
capital with arbitrary calibration ( /  = 0.77, F  = 2.69, w = 2.12):
Fig. 1.1 External finance premium and ratio of net worth to capital value
c l \
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Figure 1.1 shows that the EFP decreases as less external funds is needed with given value of 
purchased capital (less leverage) in an diminishing rate. This implies that EFP in equilibrium 
will increase dramatically even after you reduce the internal funds relative to capital value by
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only a small amount. This shows the mechanism of the accelerator effect embedded in the 
banking sector of the baseline model. To see the short-run dynamic relationship, I derive the 
log-linear form of Eq. (1.11) around the non-stochastic steady state:
EFP— i f  y N W / K  y  NW/ K
EFP 1 - y N W / K  l - y l - N W / K
E F P - 1,„ 1
- I F T ^ — y V
; (1.11L)
Eq. (1.11L) elaborates the behind scene accelerator effect from the banking sector in the 
baseline model. The short run dynamics of EFP depends on the dynamics of the net worth to 
capital value ratio, real wage for labour monitoring and exogenous loan production tech­
nology. Relating to literature, Eq. (1.11L) is highly comparable with the counterpart reduced 
form equation in BGG framework of the following (see appendix for a detailed derivation):
i = ~V(n<vl+x -  kM -  <?,); (1.11L’)
For Eq. (1.11L’), BGG claims that the elasticity of external finance premium, with respect to 
the ratio of internal funds to total value of capital, is derived from an optimal contracting 
problem between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries. Higher net worth relative to 
value of purchased capital makes more funds of entrepreneurial sector sink into the project. 
Thus the incentives are more aligned between entrepreneurs and banks so as to reduce the 
asymmetric information problem and EFP. The baseline model with loan management also 
predicts a similar aggregate relationship as in BGG, despite the fact that the corresponding 
elasticity is shown differently by an expression nesting steady state value of EFP and internal
funds to total value of capital ratio, and the parameter value of collateral share in loan
i inproduction . Besides this, the baseline model also highlights the importance of the real wage 
to influence the dynamics of EFP before subjecting to the exogenous shock in the banking
10 The elasticity in BGG equals to if/ only after figuring out the optimal loan contract between entrepreneurs 
and financial intermediaries; it also depends on micro structure of the contract environment (e.g., average 
fraction of monitoring cost after the entrepreneurs default). See the appendix or BGG for details.
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sector11. This promising increment is not revealed in BGG derivation and many other studies 
of financial frictions following BGG.
1.2.2 Households
Consider a continuum of monopolistically competitive households, indexed by j  e  [0,1], 
who decide between consumption and saving through holding bank deposits, and supply 
specialized labour services into economy-wide labour market12. The bundle of labour services 
is obtained using the aggregation scheme of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
N,=
ff„-l
( 1.12)
The optimal substitution across labour service leads to the following labour demand equation 
regarding the j  th labour service
N,(j)  = V , 0 ' ) V "
V W, J N ,l
(1.13)
where Wt ( j)  is the nominal wage set by the j  th household, Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate 
nominal wage given by Wt = [ J Wt dj ]l/(l~£w), and o g iv e s  the constant elasticity of 
substitution across differentiated labour services.
In each period, the j  th household derives utility from consumption of final goods, Ct ( j ) , and 
leisure, 1 -  Nt(J) in logarithmic separable form given by
, U, = ln(C, (j))+ ln(l -  jV, (y));
where y/ measures the households’ weight on leisure in the utility function. This specifi­
cation of preferences is consistent with the existence of the balanced growth path as discussed 
in King et al. (2002). On the other hand, following the assumption of Erceg et al. (2000) and
n  Real wage becomes relevant because it is the factor price in loan management and affects the marginal cost of 
intermediation activity.
12 As will be described later, households’ labour supply is demanded by entrepreneurs as well as banks.
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Christiano et al. (2005), the existence of state-contingent securities ensures the homogeneity 
of households’ consumption and asset holdings, left the heterogeneity only with respect to the 
wage rate they earn and the hours they work. Thus, at the first stage, the intertemporal 
problem for the j  th household is to chooses consumption and deposit holding in order to 
maximize
max Et jT/?4{ln(C()+ ly ln(l - N t( j ))};
\C,,Dt+x) h=Q
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
C. +D.„ = ^ 1 n . ( i)+R" + T' + n '+  F'(y)-,+.  p ^  - f D ,  ; (1.14)
The budget constraint can be understood as follows. Each household enters period t with 
Pt_xDt units of nominal deposits, that pay a gross nominal interest rate R"_x between t - 1  
and t , in a financial intermediary. The consideration of nominal contract between households 
and FIs is to capture the influential Fisher’s Debt-Deflation effect. The FIs real burden will 
increase/decrease when the economy is subject to deflationary/inflationary pressure. During 
period t , the yth household also supplies labour to the entrepreneurial firms and banks, for 
which he receives total factor payment of ) . In addition, he receives/pays a lump­
sum transfer/tax from/to the government, T,, as well as the dividend payments n , , and net 
cash inflows from participating in state-contingent security markets, Vt( j ) . All these funds 
are allocated for consumption PtCt , and nominal deposit holdings P,Dt+x.
As mentioned above, at the first stage, each household chooses homogenous C, and Dt+X in 
carder to maximize his expected lifetime utility with discount factor p  e  (0,1), and subject to 
his budget constraint. The F.O.C for this optimization problem is:
 ^ (1.15)
L'/ r t+1
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Eq. (1.15) is the usual intertemporal consumption and saving condition, which states that the 
marginal cost of giving up a unit of consumption in terms of utility in the current period must 
be compensated with the expected marginal benefit of holding deposit in the following period.
At the second stage, households decide on nominal wages. Given the fact that households can 
only set nominal wages in staggered contracts with a constant probability 1 -  9W , of 
renegotiation in each period, the fraction of households who have the opportunity to reset 
their wages would set it as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for 
consumption taking account the probability that he couldn’t reset the wage again. The 
fraction of households who don’t have the opportunity to reoptimise must apply the wages 
that was in effect in the preceding period indexed by the steady state gross rate of wage 
inflation, a>. This yields the following wage setting problem
P  V ' r /  /9/1 \h  UCt+h ( / >  —M R ^t+h-^t+h KT /
m a x £ , E  [ ( f id . t  - f* * -  — D---------,±!l J±!l  N hH 0 ) ] ;
' h=0 Vet ff+h
where UCt+h/U Ct is the households’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and MRS is 
the households’ intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. 
The F.O.C for this maximization problem is
E . Y m J  Ua+M / UCi.hN(+(l (J)MRSHh}
w : u ) = ^ - x - ^ ------------------------------------------------------ . 0 .1 6 )
Ua+M/Ua+h NnhU )o //P l+h}
s .
h=0
Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C imply the following wage inflation curve:
^  =  P(° M + e ^ s S  {T1T ^ h‘ - X' ( L 1 6 L )
where cot is the gross wage inflation and Xt is the multiplier of households’ budget constraint.
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1.2.3 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurial sector is modelled largely as in BGG13. The only exception is that I do 
not assume that the entrepreneurial sector is hit by idiosyncratic shock on the return of capital, 
because, different.from BGG, this assumption is not necessary to rationalize the financial 
frictions so as to generate endogenous EFP. What we rely on is the managerial cost in the FI 
sector. Aggregate shock in the baseline model is sufficient for the analysis, while extending 
to include BGG’s channel is straightforward if we want to capture financial frictions in both 
angles. The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce and analyse financial friction within 
the FI sector rather than to combine it together with that of BGG.
There are a large number of risk neutral entrepreneurs who operate in a fully competitive 
environment. Each entrepreneur needs to purchase capital in the end of each period for 
production use in the subsequent period. Capital is combined with labour service to produce 
output as follows:
Yt = A & aN f - “ i (1.17)
where Yt is output, JVf is hired labour service, Kt is purchased capital and a  is capital share 
in production function. At is an exogenous technological factor (TFP), which evolves as
lnAt = ( l - p a) ln A + p alnAt^ + £ ai; (1.18)
with p a e (0 ,l) , sat ~ iid(0,(7*). At the end of period t , entrepreneurs purchase capital, 
Kl+l, that will be used in period t + \ , at the real price Qt (in terms of the consumption good). 
The cost of capital acquisition Q,Kt+l, is financed partly by their end of period net worth 
~NWt+i , and the rest by loan Lt+l , borrowing from financial intermediaries 14. Each 
entrepreneur is risk-neutral and has finite horizons (discussed below). His demand for capital 
is determined by comparing the expected marginal return of holding capital with its expected
13 Also refer to Christiano et al. (2003), (2010), Meier and Muller (2006), Gertler et al. (2007), Christensen and 
Dib (2008), and Queijo (2009).
For the existence of credit market, entrepreneurs cannot self-finance the purchase of capital.
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marginal financing cost. In aggregate terms, the expected gross return of holding one unit of 
capital from period t to /+ 1 , EtRf+l, is described as follows15:
E & x  =  E,
Q,
(1.19)
where 8 is the depreciation rate of capital, X, is the price of intermediate goods relative to 
final goods, and Qt , as described above, is the relative price of capital which varies to the 
capital production technology described below. The term X l+la Y l+l/K t+l is the marginal 
product of capital which can be thought of as the income gain of renting capital and the term, 
Qf+l( l - 8 ) is the capital gain of holding it from period t to / + 1 . In equilibrium, this 
expected marginal return must be equal to the expected marginal cost of external financing, 
which is the expected interest rate, , on loan charged by the financial intermediary. 
Thus we have
E,R'm = Et (1.19’)
If there is no credit market imperfection in the economy, financial intermediaries would only 
charge the same interest rate as they pay for the deposit, which is the economy-wide real 
interest rate16. This assumption makes the model collapse to the standard DSGE framework a 
la Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). As shown above, the credit market 
imperfections do exist in the baseline model because of the managerial cost associated with 
transferring deposit funds into loans. Thus for each unit of loan, the FI will charge a premium 
on top of the cost of deposit. The detailed exposition of how this premium is endogenously
determined has been shown in the section of FI’s problem. For now, we should keep in mind
i
that the cost of loan is jointly determined by the cost of deposit and the EFP:
E X , =EA\x  = E,R?+lEFPI+l; (1.20)
lsAs described in BGG, single entrepreneurial activity is exposed to an idiosyncratic shock which has a mean of 
one. Thus the return o f each entrepreneur may be different from aggregate return.
Here the economy wide real interest rate is equal to the real rate paid on deposit. Since the contract between 
financial intermediaries and households are in nominal terms, the ex post real return of deposit depends on 
inflation rate.
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On the other aspect, entrepreneurial demand for labour service is determined by equalizing 
the real wage with marginal product of labour:
w, = x ,( l (1-21)
Entrepreneurs operate each period to accumulate their net worth. The net increment is 
through the retained earnings from the operation of production period by period. In order to 
make sure the necessity of external funds, they are not allowed to accumulate enough funds 
for fully self-financing. We can achieve this by assuming each of them only has finite 
expected horizon of life. The probability that each entrepreneur dies in each period is \ - v  
(i.e., there is a probability u that he survives to the next period), so his expected lifetime is 
1/(1 - u) . This assumption precludes the probability that entrepreneurs’ net worth diverges as 
well as they accumulate enough wealth to be fully self-financed such that credit markets 
disappear. They always need to borrow from the FIs to finance desired capital in excess of 
their net worth. On the other hand, this assumption is also meant to capture the phenomenon 
of ongoing births and deaths of firms. For the total amount of entrepreneurs to be constant, 
each period the same amount of new entrepreneurs enter into the economy to replace the 
departing ones. The newly entered entrepreneurs receive some transferred seed money S',, as 
initial funds17. The evolution of entrepreneurial net worth can be written as:
NW,+I = ^ Q . , K ,  -  RfEFPl(Ql_lK l -N W ,)\ +  ( \ -  v )S ,■ (1.22)
The first term in the square bracket represents the return from holding capital while the 
second is the repayment term which includes FIs’ cost of funds as well as the managerial cost, 
EFP. Note that Rf is the ex post return on capital held in time t , and R?EFPt is the ex post 
cost of borrowing. These differ from Eq. (1.20) which describes the ex ante relationship. Eq. 
(1.22) describes that retained earnings from operation in current period by surviving 
entrepreneurs and the seed money transferring to new entrepreneurs become next period’s 
entrepreneurial net wealth.
17 Without this seed money, entering entrepreneurs would have no net worth, and so they would not be able to 
buy any capital. Also, among the entrepreneurs who survive there are some who are bankrupt and have no net 
worth. Without a transfer they would not be able to buy capital either.
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1.2.4 Capital producers
Entrepreneurial demand for capital is also affected by capital adjustment costs. As 
emphasized in BGG, it is through the introduction of adjustment costs that volatile asset 
prices contribute to the fluctuations of entrepreneurial net wealth. Conceptually, it is 
convenient to consider that there is a perfectly competitive capital producing sector. Each 
period, capital producers purchase investment goods, I ,, from the entrepreneurs’ output and 
combine it with rented capital, K t , to produce new capital, K t , as follows
presence of adjustment costs in the production of capital goods. Capital producers choose the
with 0 (0) = 0 , O 'Q  > 0 , 0 ' r(.) < 0 . This increasing and concave function captures the
investment expenditure in order to maximize their profit QtKt - 1, , taking the relative price 
of capital as given. The first-order condition is
- i - i
(1.23)
Here I restrict the capital production function so that the relative price of capital is unity in 
steady state. Capital producers’ decision is linked with the entrepreneurs’ capital purchasing 
decision via the variation in the price of capital.
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
* , +1 = 4 > f ^ V , + ( ! - < % ;
\ K t J
(1.24)
Note that capital is homogeneous, so there is no difference between newly-produced and old 
capital. Old capital used by entrepreneurs is rented out for the production of new capital, and 
then returned at the same price as the newly-produced capital.
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1.2.5 Retailers
The retail sector is included to introduce nominal rigidity into this economy. Here I assume 
that entrepreneurs sell all of their output goods to retailers. Retailers purchase the homo­
genous wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them using a linear technology at 
no resource cost and sell them as final goods to households, capital producers and the 
government sector. In this way, the retailers have the monopolistic power to set the prices of 
these final goods. The reason why retailers are incorporated together with entrepreneurs is to 
avoid the complication of aggregating individual entrepreneur’s demand for capital and his 
net worth when entrepreneurs themselves are imperfect competitors. Ultimately retailers’ 
monopolistic profits belong to the households who own them, in contrast to entrepreneurs 
who are independent agents possessing their own wealth. Before exploring the retailers’ 
problem in details, I firstly derive the aggregation of final goods. The final goods Y, are 
bundles of differentiated goods Yt{j) , j  e [0,1], provided by the continuum of mono- 
polistically competitive retailers18. The aggregation follows the framework of Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) as
expenditure across differentiated goods implies a downward sloping demand function for 
goods j  :
where Pt(j)  denotes the price of good Yt(J) , Yt denotes the aggregate demand, and salso 
measures the price elasticity of demand among differentiated goods. P, denotes the price 
index of final goods given by
(1.25)
where sp is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The optimal allocation of
(1.26)
18 Recall that the assumption of linear technology for retailers ensures that the amount o f final goods varies one- 
for-one with the amount of wholesale goods in the economy.
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1
P, = ; (1.27)
Following Calvo (1983), and a discrete version as in Yun (1996), I assume that each retailer 
cannot reoptimize' its selling price unless it receives a random signal. The probability that 
each retailer can reoptimize his price in a given period is 1 -  0p, independently of other firms 
and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus the average length o f time a price 
remains unchanged is 1/(1 -  0 p ) . Retailer j  who has the opportunity to reset its price in a 
given period t  choose the price, that maximizes its expected discounted profits until
the period when they are next able to change their price. On the other hand, the retailer who 
doesn’t have the opportunity to reset price must charge the price that was in effect in the 
preceding period indexed by the steady state gross rate of inflation, n . Retailer j ’s optima- 
zation problem is:
m z x E ^ [ ( p e pf  Uf  P‘ O V ~ x , A  Ynh( j ) ] .
F' U )  h=0 U c t  " t+h
Subject to the demand function Eq. (1.26). Note that the stochastic discount factor for 
expected profits consists of the probability that retailers can change their price and the 
households’ intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The F.O.C for the optimal problem is
E . t s M O /  Uc„hJ U c„hY,+h(j)X,+h}
D "  /  ~ P h=0
' W   ; (1-28)
Sp E,2{(f!0p)H UCHhJ U Cnh Yl+hU)*h/P,+h}
_  S ___________
h= 0
Tjhe aggregate price index is given by
l-Sp , J -£p *1
p, = e PM  +o - e P)p;
Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C and aggregate price index imply the following New 
Keynesian Phillips curve:
f
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(i -  pep){ 1 -  ep) A 
  ^ —ft; (1.28L)
where ls the log deviation of real marginal cost from steady state.
1.2.6 Government and monetary policy rule
Finally I set the budget constraint for the government and the policy rule of the monetary 
authority to close the whole model. The aggregate final output goods consist of households’ 
consumption, capital producers’ investment expenditure and the government expenditure, G, . 
Every period, the market for final goods clears as
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy by controlling the gross nominal interest 
rate R? . Following conventional wisdom, I assume that the central bank adjusts the nominal 
interest rate according to a simple rule, for which it responses to the lagged inflation rate nt_x 
and the lagged interest rate R?_x. The log-linear version of monetary policy rule is
Where pr captures the empirical interest rate smoothing, kx is the elasticity of nominal 
ipterest rate with respect to deviations of lagged inflation, and s rt is an exogenous random 
shock, with zero mean and standard deviation crr, to the interest rate, reflecting either failure
(1.29)
where government expenditure is financed by lump-sum taxes and money creation
M, -  M ,_i t T,
r," = PrK-l + (1 -  Pr)KA-l + £ r, ! (1.30)
to track the rule or intentional transitory deviations from the rule (policy shock).
/
25
1.3 Equilibrium
In the baseline model, the competitive equilibrium is defined as a set o f endogenous variables 
{Yn CtJ t,K t,NWt,Lt,N f ,N ^ ,w n O)n X t,7tt,R ^ R ^ iR^iQn } which satisfies financial inter­
mediaries’ optimaf condition of Eq. (1.11), households’ optimal conditions of Eq. (1.15) and 
(1.16), entrepreneurs’ efficient conditions of Eq. (1.19), (1.20), and (1.21), capital producers’ 
optimal condition of Eq. (1.23), retailers’ optimal condition of Eq. (1.28), monetary policy 
Eq. (1.30), and resource constraints of Eq. (1.2), (1.4), (1.17), (1.22), (1.24) and (1.29). The 
exogenous shock processes are given by Eq. (1.3) and (1.18).
1.3.1 Steady state solution
The baseline model’s balance growth path is characterized by a deterministic, an exogenous 
growth mechanism of the key variables. For simplification, the growth rate is assumed to 
equal zero without any loss of generality for allowing the existence of steady state. The 
model’s non-stochastic steady state system is characterized by above equilibrium conditions 
in non time varying fashion (see appendix for the summary of the steady state system).
To solve the system, we can follow the method of continuous substitution. Start with the 
steady state version of Eq. (1.15) and combine it with the Fisher Equation, we have
Rn 1 (1.15S)
7t p
Following Eq. (1.20), we get
R* = R d x EFP = -----?-------------------------------  d 2 0 S )
fixE F P  ’
Meanwhile, we also have the following from Eq. (1.28):
V  SP ~ lX  = —— ; (1.28S)
s p
Then according to Eq. (1.19), we achieve
Y \ / { B x E F P ) - \  + S
T  = -----iTT ! 0-19S)K a ( s  -Y) s
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The above attainment predicts 
Y Y / K  Y / K
L L / K  1 - N W / K ’
On the other hand, based on Eq. (1.9), we find out UEFP equals to
EFP- 1
UEFP = 1 + ----------- — ; (1.9S)
X - y N W / K  y }
assuming we know the steady state value of EFP and N W /K . Thus combine Eq. (1.6) and 
(1.21) to eliminate real wage w , we get
N a 1 - a Y  X  
N f ~ 1 - r  L U E F P -l ’
where Y/L  , X and UEFPare given already. Since N °  + N F = N ,  we know:
N” = n °!n f+v aniN° = n ~nF ’
The next step is to combine Eq. (1.19S) and (1.17) to get
l
N G
K
Y_l_ 
K  A
1 -a
where Y/K  is given in Eq. (1.19S). Then we can easily calculate the steady state capital stock 
K ,  output 7 , and the rest variables of the model. Some key steady states are given in table 
1.2.
1.3.2 Log-linear approximation
To understand the model’s transmission mechanism subject to other shocks, we should obtain
I
the short run properties of the model. One way to capture the model’s short run dynamics is 
to log-linearize all the equilibrium conditions around their non-stochastic steady states. After 
derivations, the log-linear approximations for the equilibrium system are given by:
L i = / , +  A +1 + m  + (1 -  r)nF; (1.2L)
t  „ NW  „ M F ,,
= ~<l, + —  nw,+i + (1 -  — ; (1-4L)
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EFP- 1 y N W / K  y  N W/ K
EFP
E F P - I , .  *
EFP 1 - y
1 - y N W / K  l - y l - N W / K  
1
c ,= -E ,C m  + K  
>V = a ,+ a £ ,+ ( l-a )n ,G;
d - ^ ) ;
E,r,k+I= r f +  efp ,;
R‘
*Gw, = x, + y, -n, ;
* rew.j = £* -  (— — 1)^ *1 -  (— —  1)<#M + nw,
NW  ' W  ' 1 NW Jy"  'uRk M
A J  ^ *
h ^ — V t + h ;
9
£ +i = ( ! - < % + 4 ;
* ^  . (i
+ ---------- 2 --------- x '>
up
.  C . /  *
y t = Y ct + Y h;
K  =  A 'i - i  + ( ! - P r ) * A - i  +  ;
(1.11L)
(1.15L) 
(1.16L)
(1.19L)
(1.20L)
(1.21L)
(1.22L)
(1.23L)
(1.24L)
(1.28L)
(1.29L)
(1.30L)
Following the convention, all the variables with hat on top denote their percentage deviations 
from non-stochastic steady state. Using Uhlig’s undetermined coefficients procedure yields a 
stpte space solution of the form19:
•Vi = +  ^ i s t+\\ . (1*31)
dt = Q 3st ' (1.32)
19 The detailed methodological exposition is given in Uhlig (1999), whereby the Matlab programme is available 
at his homepage (http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wpoLlitmFtoolkit.htm).
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where the state variable vector, st , includes predetermined and exogenous variables; d t is the 
vector of control variables; and the vector s t contains the random innovations. The 
coefficient matrices, f ij  , Q 2 , and £23 , have elements that depend on the structural 
parameters of the model. Therefore, the state space solution, (1.31) and (1.32) are used to 
simulate the model later when showing the results.
1.4 Quantitative experiments
Using the log-linear system above, I am able to conduct some quantitative experiments in this 
section. The model is calibrated to US economy and I will simulate the baseline model as 
well as BGG to compare the responses of variables to exogenous shocks in monetary policy 
as well as goods technology.
1.4.1 Parameterization
To conduct quantitative analysis, first of all, we set parameter values to calibrate the baseline 
model to the US economy. Since the baseline model generally follows the setup of BGG and 
the current state of DSGE models, I generally do the calibration based on previous studies. 
To compromise, I will do sensitivity analysis on some key parameters below to check the 
robustness of the baseline results. BGG’s original parameterization is a good benchmark for 
the baseline calibration. I will set most of the parameter values based on that. As a comple­
ment, I will also refer to more recent studies which estimate those parameters in a full DSGE 
environment (e.g., Christenson and Dib (2008)). For the parameters in banking sector, I will 
generally consult the parameterization of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) as well as other 
studies that include a banking sector in general equilibrium model.
To summarize, there are four sets of parameters for which we can calibrate the values in 
sequence. The first set includes all the parameters in the state-of-the-art DSGE models, from 
which we can borrow those numbers directly. The households’ discount factor, (5, is set to 
0.99 to yield the annual net real risk-free rate 4%. The relative weights of leisure in utility y/ , 
is picked up to capture the average fraction of hours worked, 31%. The share of capital a  is 
set to equal 0.36 as this value is canonical in RBC literature. For the capital depreciation rate
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S , the value 0.025 is chosen to capture the averages over the post war sample period. The 
parameters associated with price and wage rigidity are given according to the literature (e.g., 
Christiano et al. 2005), where the elasticity of demand for goods, s p , and labour, s w, are 11 
and 21 such that the steady state markups are 10% in the goods market and 5% in labour 
market, and the probability of not reoptimizing for price setters 6p , and for wage setters 0W, 
are both 0.75. The autocorrelation of goods technology shock is following the conventional 
value of 0.9.
The second set of parameters are introduced in BGG 1999 handbook chapter, which includes 
the entrepreneurs’ surviving rate at the end of each period, u , the capital price elasticity of 
investment to capital stock ratio, q>, and the elasticity of external finance premium with 
respect to the ratio of internal funds to total value of purchased capital, if/. For u,  I will stick 
to the value 0.9728 suggested in BGG since this value are also used in many later studies as 
well. The other two parameters, q> and if/, are key to BGG’s financial accelerator mechanism, 
since (p measures the level of capital adjustment cost and so the response of investment to 
shocks and if/ directly captures the degree of financial accelerator effect. Nevertheless, the 
values of these two parameters are subject to controversies20. Originally, BGG set (p equal to 
0.25 and if/ equal to 0.05. These define a relatively low level of capital adjustment cost and 
high degree of financial accelerator effect. After BGG, three studies have estimated these two 
parameters in full DSGE environment using different estimation methodologies. Christenson 
and Dib (2008) used classical maximum likelihood method to estimate the value of q> be 0.59 
and if/ be 0.042 for US economy in the post Volcker era. Meier and Muller (2006) matched 
the model impulse response after a monetary shock with that from empirical VAR studies and 
found an even higher value of q>, 0.65, but insignificant i//. De Graeve (2008) estimated if/
to be around 0.1 with Bayesian methods. Since he specified investment adjustment cost rather
I
than capital adjustment cost assumed here, there is no counterpart <p over there for reference. 
Besides above three, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) calibrated these two values to be 1 and 
0.037 for the sample period 1960-2006. To compromise with all above studies, I set the value 
of (p be 0.5 and if/ be 0.035 in the baseline calibration to get benchmark results for comparison.
20 BGG calibrate if/ = 0.05 based on realistic values for monitoring costs and bankruptcy rates. They also argue 
that a reasonable value for (p lies between 0 and 0.5.
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Table 1.1 Parameters in the model
Parameter Description Value
P Household's discount factor 0.99
V Weight on leisure in utility 2.47
a Share o f capital in goods production 0.36
8 Capital depreciation rate 0.025
8, Retailers' probability o f not able to  reset price 0.75
8, Households' probability o f not able to  reset wage 0.75
Sp Goods elasticity o f demand 11
Labour elasticity o f demand 21
v Entrepreneurs' surviving rate 0.9728
<P Curvature of capital adjustment cost function 0.5
W EFP elasticity of net worth to collateral value ratio 0.035
r Share of collateral in loan production 0.65
P r Interest rate smoothing 0.8
Elasticity o f policy rate to inflation deviation 1.5
fh Autocorrelation of goods productivity shock 0.9
The third set consists of two parameters in the banking sector, which are the share of 
collateral in loan production/management function y , and the elasticity of Ft with respect to 
the state of economy 6 . These two parameters are crucial to the banking sector transmission 
mechanism in the baseline model. The higher are y  and <9, the stronger is the elasticity of 
external finance premium to the corresponding arguments. To pin down the value of y , the 
first reference is Goodffiend and McCallum (2007) where they set y  equal to 0.65, which 
indicates relatively low elasticity. However, several other studies Benk, Gillman and Kejak 
(2005), (2008) and (2010), and Leao (2003), which also hold credit production function in 
their model, choosey from 0.73 to 0.89. Based on all of these, I set the value of y equal to 
0.65 following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) for the baseline calibration and alter it later 
in plausible range of 0.65-0.89. 0 is a free parameter only to capture the reduced from 
elasticity of EFP to the state of the economy, we set it equal to a plausible value of 0.2, which
/
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T ab le  1.2 S teady sta te  in th e  m odel econom y
Variable Definition Value
I. Steady state values
A „ Goods sector productivity level 1
F loan productivity level 2.15
Rd Risk-free rate 1.01
Rk Gross return on capital 1.0176
R” Nominal interest rate 1.0194
7C inflation rate 1.0092
EFP External financing premium 1.0075
N° Labour service in goods sector 0.3
n f Labour service in banking sector 0.005
II. Steady-state ratios
Y / K Output to capital 0.13
I / Y Investment to output 0.19
C/Y Consumption to output 0.61
G/Y Govt expenditure to output 0.2
L / K Leverage ratio 0.5
N f / N Financial hour to total hour 1.7%
implies the EFP elasticity to output and nominal interest rate is equivalent with that to real 
wage in Eq. (1.20L). This value implies 20% of Ft is endogenously determined.
The final set regards those parameters in the monetary policy reaction function. I generally 
fallow Clarida et al. (2000) and set the interest rate smoothing parameter pr equal to 0.8, and 
the policy response to past inflation kk to 1.5.
Finally, some key steady state values" are chosen to finish the calibration. The external finance 
premium is generally unobservable in reality, for which we can only refer to some close 
indicators to pin down the steady state value. It is set to 1.0075 for baseline value, 
corresponding to an annual risk spread of 300 basis points, approximating the post war
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average spread between the corporate bond rate and the three-month treasury bill rate. This is 
consistent with the estimates in Queijo (2009) and lies within the range reported in De Fiore 
and Uhlig (2005)21. The steady state quarterly gross inflation is set to 1.0092, implying the 
nominal interest rate of 1.0194. Following BGG, the steady state leverage ratio of entre­
preneurs is set to 50%, which means the ratio of net worth to value o f purchased capital is 0.5. 
The steady state consumption, investment and government expenditure share of GDP are 
given by 0.603, 0.192 and 0.205, respectively to match the historical average. In labour 
market, the steady state ratio of monitoring hour relative to goods produce hour is 1.7%. 
Table 1.1 and 1.2 present all parameter and steady state values for the baseline calibration.
1.4.2 Findings
After calibration, this section presents the main findings about the abilities of banking 
frictions to transmit shocks hitting the economy. I mainly consider the impulse responses to 
two well known shocks: monetary policy shock (i.e. demand side) and goods technology 
shock (i.e. supply side). First of all, I show the baseline model’s transmission mechanism, 
stemming from the financial frictions within the banking sector, and compare it to that from 
BGG. For the sake of consistent comparison, the model, for this moment, is abstracted from 
nominal contract and wage rigidity, since they are not modelled in BGG. Secondly, I go one 
step further to show how the performances of banking accelerator is altered by the values of 
collateral share in loan production function y . Thirdly, the effect of nominal contract is 
considered. This is to show how the transmission is altered by the so called Debt-Deflation 
mechanism. Finally, the role of nominal wage rigidity is highlighted to show the distinct 
feature of the current model to other models in the literature of financial frictions.
lU.2.1 Baseline banking frictions versus BGG
Here I examine the responses of the baseline model to two types of shocks: a monetary policy 
shock and a goods productivity shock. The results are compared with that of the standard no 
financial friction (NoFF) model to see the amplification and propagation mechanism. The 
NoFF model is the one with perfect financial intermediation technology so that the banking
^  In De Fiore and Uhlig (2005), the reported range for annual risk premiums on bonds and loans in U.S. is 
between 160 and 340 basis points.
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sector is costless. In addition, BGG results are also plotted as a benchmark to see the relative 
strength of banking accelerator effect with the baseline parameter values. Figure 1.2 plots the 
responses of output, investment, consumption, loan, net worth, capital price, real wage, 
inflation and external finance premium to an unanticipated expansionary shock to monetary 
policy rule. The shock hits the economy at time 0 and the time units here and in all 
subsequent figures are in quarters. For each single graph the dotted line designated the 
standard no friction response, generated by fixing the EFP at its steady state level instead of 
allowing it to respond to changes in the state of the economy. This implies the benchmark 
simulation are based on model with the same steady state as the BGG model and the baseline 
banking accelerator model, but in which the additional dynamics associated with the 
accelerator effect have been turned off. The dashed line stands for the response in BGG 
financial accelerator framework and the solid line is that from the baseline banking friction 
model.
The banking accelerator effect is clearly seen in the diagram. In the impact period, an 
unanticipated drop in interest rate stimulates the demand for capital, which in turn pushes up 
investment and the price of capital. The rise of asset prices makes the return on capital higher, 
raising the net worth of entrepreneurs. The speed of increase in the net worth overtakes that 
of the capital demand, entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio decrease, leading to lower marginal cost 
of bank intermediation and lower EFP despite the real wage that drives up the EFP is also 
jumping up. Compared with no friction case, amplification mechanism appears. In addition, 
the decreased EFP further stimulates investment, demand of capital and asset price, causing 
the economy running into a loop and the increment of net worth is very persistent. Thus we 
see both the amplification and propagation effect in the baseline banking transmission model.
This result resembles that of BGG well qualitatively.
I
Thus the baseline model can obtain a similar accelerator effect of BGG in the end, but with 
completely different explanation. BGG attributes the variation of EFP to the cost of state 
verification (outside the banking sector) assumption while I offer an explanation of changes 
in EFP from varying marginal cost within the banking sector. However, the acceleration 
effect in the baseline model is smaller than that of BGG. The initial magnification of output 
and investment in baseline model only captures half of that in BGG. This reflects the smaller
/
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Fig. 1.2 Impulse responses to expansionary monetary policy shock
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elasticity o f EFP with respect to net worth capital ratio in the baseline model subject to 
standard calibration (see Eq. (1.11L)).
Figure 1.3 shows the response o f the model economy to supply shocks (rise in the goods 
sector productivity). By contrast to BGG, here the banking frictions generate a slight 
decelerator effect even not very significant. This can be understood if we focus on the 
behaviour o f EFP. For most o f the time, EFP is higher than steady state value. This is because 
the real wage is procyclical and expands significantly. Remember higher real wage drives up 
EFP. Thus the net worth increases less than that in frictionless model. In the same way, the 
behaviours o f other variables, like output and investment, is decelerated. On the other hand, 
the time paths for nominal rate (not shown) and inflation are quite similar in the three models, 
reflecting that the monetary authority conducts policy concentrating on inflation only.
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Fig. 1.3 Impulse responses to positive goods tchnology shock
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1.4.2.2 E x p erim en ts  w ith  d ifferen t co lla te ra l sh a re .
After we see the qualitative similarity o f the transmission mechanism between the baseline 
model and BGG, it is natural to further enquire about the quantitative performance o f the 
baseline model. This section shows how the amplification or attenuation mechanism in the 
baseline model is altered. As shown in Eq. (1.11L), in light o f  banking sector profit max­
imization the elasticity o f EFP with respect to net worth capital ratio is determined by three 
factors: Steady state level o f external finance premium, steady state leverage ratio and the 
share o f collateral in loan production y . Since the former two are fixed in many studies since 
BGG, I will keep it steady and vary the latter22.
22 At least one exception is Christiano et al. (2010) where they fixed the leverage ratio to 0.23 in their model and 
argued that the data between 1998Q1 and 2003Q4 shows that this ratio is in the range o f 0.18-0.44.
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Fig. 1.4 Impulse responses to expansionary monetary policy shock with different y .
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Following the discussion in the parameterization section, the value o f y  is subject to 
discrepancies from 0.65 to 0.89 in several different studies. The banking accelerator model 
only captures about half o f BGG with the baseline value o f 0.65, for which we can alter the 
value o f y  to see different degree of elasticities. To remind us, the elasticity is give by
N W / K  '  
y  1 -  N W / K ,
Proposition 1.2: The elasticity o f  external finance premium with respect to net worth 
collateral ratio is an increasing and convex function o f  the share o f  
collateral in loan production, y .
The mathematical proof o f proposition 1.2 is shown in Appendix A, while the quantitative 
exemplification is shown in figure 1.4 and 1.5. Figure 1.4 displays the impulse response for
E la stic ity  =
E F P -  1
E F P
+ r
y N W / K  
I - y  N W / K  1 -
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Fig. 1.5 Impulse responses to positive goods technology shock with different y .
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an expansionary monetary policy. In each graph, the solid line represents the response o f  the 
economy with baseline value o f 0.65 (lower bound). The dotted and dashed lines stand for the 
banking accelerator model with y  equals to median value o f  0.8 (approximately match BGG), 
and upper bound 0.89. The increased elasticity o f  EFP with higher value o f y  is clearly seen 
in all the graphs. With low value o f y ,  0.65, the impact period amplification for output and 
investment is weaker than that o f BGG while the magnification catch up and go exceeding 
BGG as we increase y  to the upper bound 0.89. The increase o f  the amplification is non­
linear since the difference o f the initial jump between 0.89 and 0.8 is much larger than that 
between 0.8 and 0.65, though the value o f y  increases by more in the latter. Thus the diagram 
confirms that the magnification effect is an increasing and convex function o f  y . The value 
o f y  that captures the elasticity similar to BGG is 0.8. Therefore, in order to make the 
banking accelerator effect catching the BGG one, we need a relatively high value o f y . My 
personal perception is that the value o f 0.8 lies within the plausible range and is acceptable.
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Fig. 1.6 Impulse responses to expansionary monetary policy shock
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Moreover, other aspects o f banking accelerator mechanism assumed in this model can also do 
compensation, which is shown in the next subsection. Despite o f  the large discrepancies in 
the amplification effect, the differences in propagation mechanism are relatively small, 
reflecting the three models with different values o f  y  follow quite similar loop o f 
multiplicative effect.
Figure 1.5 plots the responses o f the economy to a positive goods technology shock. The 
diagram also confirms the legitimacy o f proposition 3 graphically. Compared with the 
baseline model, models with larger collateral share in loan production function can overturn 
the decelerator effect and generate more and more accelerator effect. The upper bound value 
o f y , 0.89, leads to the largest accelerator effect, along with the highest contribution o f net 
worth to capital purchasing and the deepest drop o f EFP. The overall picture indicates that
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Fig. 1.7 Impulse responses to positive productivity shock with nominal contract.
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economy.
1.4.2.3 E ffect o f  nom inal co n trac t
The baseline model o f  banking friction is shown to have strong enough power to amplify and 
propagate the responses o f the economy to shocks by altering the transmission mechanism of 
the no friction model. In this sub-section, we also find out that normally the acceleration 
effect is stronger when the economy is hit by demand shocks (e.g., monetary shock) than 
when the economy is subject to supply shocks (e.g., productivity shock). This phenomenon 
stems from the well known Fisher’s Debt-deflation effect: the real burden o f borrowers is 
higher when the economy is experiencing deflation because the nom inal debt is now 
exacerbated in real terms with declining price level. Since supply shock always drives output 
and price in different direction, the acceleration effect is attenuated in this scenario. In the
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Fig. 1.8 Impulse responses to expansionary monetary shock with Calvo wage
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baseline setting, the contract between FIs and households is in real term so that the Debt- 
deflation effect is not passing through. It is straightforward to conjecture this effect would be 
magnified when the contract is in nominal term. To see the effect o f nominal contract is the 
object in this sub-section.
Figure 1.6 displays the impulse responses o f the model economy with nominal contract 
between households and FIs to expansionary monetary shock. Since the contract is tied up in 
nominal term, the initial real cost o f deposit is totally determined by inflation, which has 
upward pressure subject to expansionary monetary shock. The immediate rise o f inflation 
dampens the real cost o f deposit fully and is in favour o f entrepreneurial net worth 
accumulation because the FIs will adjust the loan rate according to the real cost o f deposit. 
On the other hand, the increase o f net worth reduces the loan needs and decreases the 
marginal cost in the loan intermediation and so EFP. As shown in figure 1.6, because
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Fig. 1.9 Impulse responses to positive technology shock with Calvo wage
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inflation has upward pressure subject to demand shock, net worth increases significantly and 
makes the entrepreneurs less dependent on external funds (loan decreases), the EFP declines 
dramatically compared with real contract case (figure 1.2). Also, the EFP in banking friction 
model has a trend-reverting dynamics because o f the initial increase o f real wage, which 
causes the EFP not able to reach the lowest value at the beginning.
I
The impulse responses o f the model economy with nominal contract to positive technology 
shock are shown in figure 1.7. The key difference is that when the economy is hit by a supply 
shock, inflation is decreasing and driving up the real cost o f  deposit. Although economic 
expansion turns to increase the return on capital and entrepreneurial net worth, the increase in 
real cost o f deposit offsets the positive effect partially or even fully so that the overall 
response o f net worth is uncertain. On the other hand, since the response o f net worth is not
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strong, the dependence on external funds is not reduced but increased, making firm’s 
leverage ratio and EFP higher. The increase of EFP also dampens the accumulation of net 
worth that is the key determinant of future EFP. Thus the overall effect is that when the 
economy is subject to nominal contract, financial frictions turn to attenuate the response of 
the economy to goods technology shock rather than to magnify. We can see both BGG and 
banking friction model have weaker responses compared with NoFF model. The dynamic of 
EFP in banking friction model is also depending on real wage, distinguishing itself to that in 
BGG. This result is consistent with the recent literature (e.g., Christenson and Dib 2008, 
Christiano et al. 2010) assuming nominal contract.
1.4.2.4 Role of nominal wage rigidity
As shown in Eq. (1.21L), an increase/decrease of real wage relative to the steady state leads 
to an rise/decline of EFP by a factor of (EFP-1)/EFP. This inspires the following con­
jecture: Relative to BGG, the banking transmission model can give extra acceleration effect if 
both EFP and real wage are countercyclical/procyclical on the condition of an expansion- 
nary/contractionary shock. Oppositely, it can attenuate the effect of BGG if real wage is 
procyclical/countercyclical when EFP is countercyclical/procyclical on the condition of an 
expansionary/contractionary shock. For instance, assume a shock hits the economy, drives 
output up and EFP down, displaying amplification effect in BGG. Meanwhile, real wage is 
countercyclical, thus push down EFP even more, which accelerate the BGG amplification 
effect even further. Nevertheless, this is not a common situation in reality since the shock 
stimulating the economy always drives up the real wage simultaneously. Hence, the inclusion 
of factor price in (1.11 L) often dampens the acceleration effect. However, one exception is 
the model with nominal wage rigidity. In this case, the expansionary monetary shock 
stimulates the whole economy with the acceleration effect presenting. This stems from the 
countercyclical movement of real wage. The dynamic of real wage is determined by 
comparing the movements of wage inflation with that of price inflation. Real wage is 
positively related to wage inflation, but negatively related to price inflation, both one for one. 
With wage rigidity, wage inflation can be more sluggish than price inflation. This mechanism 
is able to make real wage countercyclical subject to monetary shock.
/
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As shown in figure 1.8, real wage is procyclical when the model is without nominal wage 
rigidity, but countercyclical when nominal wage rigidity presents, making the initial response 
of EFP stronger. More rigidity there is, stronger the initial response of EFP. Thus relatively 
large inertia in nominal wage setting is the key for this effect to be empirically relevant. The 
extra acceleration effect does appear as explained above. Subject to expansionary monetary 
shock, the decline of real wage causes EFP to drop more for models with wage setting. We 
can see from the diagram that the EFP’s initial response is nearly doubled. However, the 
dynamics of EFP in the model with wage rigidity is less persistent. This stems from the 
dynamics of loan which controls the firm’s leverage and EFP. As the effect is stronger the 
more rigid is the nominal wage, it is reasonable to imagine that in the model with wage 
rigidity only, we can see much more differences in the models’ dynamics.
Figure 1.9 plots the impulse responses of the model subject to technology shock. As expected, 
the response of real wage in the model with wage rigidity is smaller than that in the model 
without. Interestingly, the response of EFP in the wage rigidity model is still stronger than 
that in the baseline model without wage rigidity. This stems from the dynamics of other 
variables that also determine the behaviour of EFP. For instance, the loan is higher in the 
wage model, making the leverage higher and so EFP higher. Another notable feature is that 
although output and investment are more amplified in the model with wage rigidity, they are 
less persistent. The reason can be the behaviour of EFP that is more persistently higher in the 
model with wage rigidity, causing the output and investment come back quicker.
1.5 Conclusion
In a well-known paper, BGG document the credit market imperfections by referring to the 
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries ex ante and the 
costly state verification once entrepreneurs default to the contract ex post. Based on this, they 
are able to derive that the financial frictions are relevant to the entrepreneurial balance sheet 
condition. However, their framework is subject at least two limitations. One is the absence of 
an explicit problem or role for this passive financial intermediary or banking sector, which 
behaves only as a veil. Moreover, the monitoring cost in BGG is treated as a deadweight loss
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measured in consumption goods, for which we have no idea how and where this cost is 
distributed explicitly.
This chapter provides an alternative modelling strategy to rationalize the financial frictions on 
the one hand, and addresses the aforementioned limitations in BGG on the other. By contrast 
to BGG, the model in this chapter ascribes the financial friction to the internal cost along the 
loan management in the banking sector. Banks require collateral evaluation and labour 
monitoring when producing loans. Thus for each unit of loan, the cost includes the factor 
prices paid to collateral and labour services on top of the return on deposit. Since banks tend 
to maximize their market value, all the cost is transferred to entrepreneurs. In this setting, the 
stake of entrepreneurs in the production is relevant to determine the EFP because of the 
grounds from two aspects: (i) the ratio of entrepreneurial net wealth to collateral (economy- 
wide capital) value influences the total managerial cost in the banking sector; (ii) entre­
preneurs’ holding of collateral help mitigate the EFP since part of the service return on 
collateral is distributed to the entrepreneurial sector. According to these, I can derive an 
observationally equivalent relationship between EFP and the stake of entrepreneurs in the 
production as in BGG. This provides a rationale for us to understand the financial frictions 
from a different angle. Besides the leverage ratio, the EFP is shown to be determined also by 
factor price of loan management, the variation of capital price and the aggregate economic 
conditions, for which I believe the model in this chapter derives a mechanism that contains 
broader ingredients in determining the behaviour of EFP.
Despite the consideration of the financial frictions from supply side of the credit market, 
however, this model is still silent about the banks’ balance sheet condition in determining the 
EFP on the one hand and the transmission mechanism of the aggregate economy on the other, 
to light of the recent global financial crisis, it should be necessary to investigate the relevance 
of banks’ balance sheet condition to financial frictions and economic contractions and put 
this into future research agenda.
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Chapter 2
Financial Sector Shocks, External Finance 
Premium and Business Cycle
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2.1 Introduction
The very recent financial crisis and possibly ongoing economic recession demonstrated that 
the financial sector should be an important factor which can influence the economic activity. 
As stated in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2009), we no longer need to appeal either to the Great 
Depression or to the experiences of many emerging market economies to motivate interest on 
the role of financial factors in aggregate fluctuations since the worst financial crisis and 
economic downturn of the post war era is currently undergoing.
The importance of financial factor in shaping business cycle has been studied extensively in 
the literature. One of the most notable contributions in dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) context is by Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), BGG hereafter. 
They develop the so-called financial accelerator mechanism and demonstrate that the 
existence of an optimal financial contracting, in an environment of information asymmetry 
between lenders and entrepreneurs, can magnify and propagate the responses of the economy 
to some main underlying shocks (e.g., monetary and total factor productivity (TFP)). Thus 
the financial markets may unavoidably increase the volatility of the economy through the 
endogenous variation of financial frictions.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the financial sector in BGG solely plays a role of 
transmitting shocks originating from other sectors. Thus the framework only captures one 
branch of the financial factors which should also include the fact that financial structure of 
the economy can also be an independent source of volatilities as suggested by recent 
economic events. For this reason, the importance of financial sector as an original source of 
aggregate fluctuations is still under investigation.
To fill this gap, this chapter tries to explore the quantitative role of financial sector 
disturbances in shaping the US business cycle. Built on the model developed in the last 
chapter, I am able to introduce two financial sector shocks into the model from two different 
sources. One is the shock to the loan management technology. We treat it as the supply side 
disturbance because it lies within the banking sector. The other shock stems from the demand 
side of the financial sector, characterizing as the shock to the entrepreneurial net worth. It is
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very important to introduce the two shocks together so that we have a complete picture in 
mind how the disturbances originating from the financial sector affect the aggregate economy.
Before moving to the results of this chapter, it is useful to have a brief review of related 
studies in order to keep the literature on track. One notable contribution recently is by Nolan 
and Thoenissen (2009), henceforth NT. They extract the entrepreneurial net wealth shock 
along with the TFP and monetary shocks for US economy from a DSGE model with financial 
accelerator mechanism a la BGG and name it as a shock to the efficiency of the financial 
sector. They try to distil the contribution to US business cycle of financial shock on top of the 
financial friction mechanism. They conclude that their extracted financial shock process is 
found to (i) be very tightly linked with the onset of recessions, more so than TFP or monetary 
shocks; (ii) remains contractionary after recessions have ended; (iii) account for a large part 
of the variance of GDP; (iv) be strongly negatively correlated with the external finance 
premium (EFP).
Despite these promising findings, the financial shock constructed in NT shouldn’t be 
considered as a complete description of the disturbance in the financial sector because they 
only considered the demand side. It is important to recognize that both BGG and NT only 
considered the demand side of the financial markets. The financial friction developed in BGG 
is built upon the balance sheet of entrepreneurial sector. Entrepreneurial net worth is crucial 
to determine the cost of external funds which can influence the demand of external funds by 
entrepreneurs. Similarly, if the net worth is subject to stochastic disturbance, the shock only 
affects the entrepreneurial balance sheet and the demand side of the financial market. Regard 
the recent financial crisis, it seems more appropriate to also think about the effects from the 
supply side of the financial market, the financial intermediaries/banking sector.
I
Up to date, several studies have been considering the banking sector in determining the 
financial frictions on the one hand, and the disturbance in financial intermediaries as a source 
of business fluctuations on the other. Markovic (2006) introduces the bank capital channel in 
the monetary transmission mechanism on top of the corporate balance sheet channel as in 
BGG and highlights three sub-channels in the banking sector (supply side): default risk 
channel, adjustment cost channel and capital loss channel. He concludes that all the three
/
48
channels in the banking sector reinforce the aggregate credit channel in the monetary 
transmission mechanism and increase the effects significantly in the event of large shocks to 
the value of bank capital. Zhang (2009) considers the bank’s balance sheet effect from a 
different angle where banking sector is assumed to share the risk with entrepreneurial sector. 
When the economy is subject to large adverse shock, both the entrepreneurial and banking 
sector balance sheets are exposed to the risk and the deterioration of the two balance sheets 
reinforce each other and drive the economy down further. Aguiar and Drumond (2009) also 
emphasize the relevance of bank capital channel in determining the aggregate fluctuations, 
but from the Basel regulatory perspective.
Most of the studies (e.g., above studies) focusing on the bank capital channel in the model’s 
transmission mechanism also stress the significance of disturbance to bank capital per se, but 
to a limited extend. They only deal with the impulse response conditional on the bank capital 
shock, but generally ignore the explicit time series process of the shock and its influence on 
the whole business cycle. One notable exception is Hirakata et al. (2010) who estimate a 
DSGE model with banking sector using Bayesian methodology and extract the shocks to the 
bank’s net worth. Based on variance decomposition, shocks to the banking sector are found to 
be a main source of the spread variations and play a significant role for investment volatility.
All these studies convey an important signal that supply side friction and disturbance in the 
financial sector are also relevant to aggregate fluctuations; thus should be dictated for more 
attention and exploration. This chapter works along this line and focuses on the role of supply 
side disturbance in financial market in shaping the business cycle. Specifically, the model, 
built on the one in the last chapter, generally follows the setup of BGG and NT except that I 
replace the optimal contracting problem between lender and borrower with explicit profit 
Maximization in banking sector subject to a loan production function. The profit maximi­
zation in banking sector can predict a relationship between EFP and corporate balance sheet 
condition as well as factor price in the banking sector. In this way, both the demand side 
(entrepreneurial sector) and the supply side (banking sector) contribute to the financial 
frictions. The shock to the technology in loan production manifests itself as the disturbance in 
banking sector. With the shock to entrepreneurial net wealth, we can see the perturbation in 
both of the supply and demand side in financial markets. By and large, this strategy extends
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the work of NT by allowing another shock in the banking sector on top of the net worth shock 
to affect the financial sector and the whole economy on the one hand, and distinguish itself to 
the work of Hirakata et al. (2010) who designate the disturbance in banking sector to bank net 
wealth on the other23.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows. First of all, use the 
shock construction procedure discussed in details below, I can extract the four shocks in 
which TFP, monetary and net worth shocks are close to their counterparts in NT on the one 
hand, and TFP as well as monetary shocks are observationally similar to the ones constructed 
with traditional estimation procedure on the other. This can be treated as a robust check that 
the inclusion of another shock wouldn’t alter the processes of shocks originally generated in 
NT despite the fact that my model setup is slightly different from theirs.
Second, subject to the interesting, but also a little bit confusing result in NT that the net worth 
shock remains contractionary after recessions have ended, it is promising to find that, after 
add in the loan productivity shock, all the post war recessions happen only when both of the 
entrepreneurial net worth and the loan productivity shocks are in contraction, implying either 
one of them is not strong enough to cause an economy-wide recession.
Third, both of the extracted loan productivity and net worth shock are negatively correlated 
with proxies of EFP, despite the fact that the correlation between net worth shock and EFP is 
higher in absolute value. We can conjecture from it, that the loan productivity shock is also 
significant in shaping the financial business cycle even if it is not the dominant one.
Fourth, consistent with our prediction, the variance decomposition indicates that loan 
productivity shock is an important source of EFP variation, though the dominant driving 
force is still net worth shock. This somehow matches the result in Hirakata et al. (2010) in 
which they predict a quantitatively similar feature of bank capital shock in determining EFP. 
Even though we assume the shock in the banking sector with different essence, Hirakata et al. 
(2010) and I reach similar result in this dimension. Finally, net worth shock is still a dominant 
factor along several other dimensions of the economy after we include the loan productivity
23 Current model is different from that in Hirakata et al. (2010) in other respective as well. In Hirakata et al. 
(2010), more shocks are used since they apply the Bayesian estimation where I follow the shock construction 
procedure developed in Benk et al. (2005), (2008).
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shock, more important than TFP and monetary shock in determining output, investment, loan, 
hours and federal funds rate, while the loan productivity shock plays a minor role.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 derives the model used in this 
chapter. Section 2:3 calibrates the model to quarterly data of US economy. The construction 
of all shock processes and numerical simulation are carried out in section 2.4. Section 2.5 
concludes with some final remarks.
2.2 The model
The designated model I develop here is a standard DSGE New Keynesian model largely 
follows BGG’s original setup and NT’s extension. One noticeable exception is that I develop 
the financial frictions with a fully micro-founded loan production/management function and a 
financial intermediaries’ profit maximization problem instead of BGG’s original optimal 
contracting problem. The other one is that I introduce one more shock from the supply side of 
financial market on top of the net wealth shock from the demand side as in NT.
Besides the banking sector, the model economy is inhabited by households, three types of 
producers: entrepreneurs, capital producers, and retailers, and a government who conducts 
monetary policy. Households own differentiated labour service and have the power to set the 
nominal wage in the labour market as in Erceg et al. (2000). Entrepreneurs produce 
intermediate goods and borrow from banks that convert household deposits into business 
financing for the purchase of capital. The presence of collateral evaluation and labour 
monitoring costs create the financial friction, which causes loan interest rate higher than 
deposit interest rate. This makes the entrepreneurial demand for capital depends on their 
financial position and the supply of external funds depends on the state of the economy. The 
interaction between the demand and supply equilibrates the credit market. Capital producers 
purchase investment goods and build new capital to sell to the entrepreneurs. This captures 
the up and down movement of asset prices. Retailers present because it is more convenient to 
introduce nominal stickiness this way to keep track of the development in conventional 
dynamic New Keynesian framework. They set nominal prices in a staggered fashion a la 
Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996).
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2.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of monopolistically competitive households, 
indexed by j  e  [0,1], who consume, work and save. Each of them supplies differentiated 
labour service to the entrepreneurial and banking sector, which regard each of their labour 
service as an imperfect substitute for that of others. In this setup, entrepreneurs and banks 
demand bundles of labour services, which is obtained using the aggregation scheme as in 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
N, = I n ,U) c‘ dj
Ew — 1
£ „  >  1 ;
The optimal substitution across labour service leads to the following labour demand equation 
regarding the j  th labour service
N,{j) = W , U ) X
V " , J
where Wt(J)is the nominal wage set by they'th household, Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate 
nominal wage given by Wt -  \_^Wt( j )x~Ew<#]1/(1_£w), and o g iv e s  the constant elasticity of 
substitution across labour service.
To motivate the demand for money, I follow Sidrauski-Brock and include money in the 
utility function of households24. Thus the j  th household derives the expected life time utility 
from consumption (with external habit) of final goods, Ct(J) , real balance holding, 
M t O ') //) , and leisure, 1 — N t ( j ) ; with discount factor, p  e  (0,1), this is given by
U = E ^ [
24 This setup follows Nolan and Thoenissen (2008).
where C, is aggregate consumption, r f , r f  and rjx measure the intertemporal elasticity of
real balance and leisure in the utility function.
The j  th household enters period t with Pt_xDt{j) units of nominal deposits in a financial 
intermediary, and nominal money balances, M,_x( j ). While deposits pay a gross nominal 
interest rate, R?_x, between t -  1 and t , money balances bear no interest. During period t , the 
j  th household supplies labour to the entrepreneur firms and banks, for which he receives 
total factor payment of Wt(J)Nt(J ) . In addition, he receives a lump-sum transfer from the 
monetary authority, Tt(J ) , as well as the dividend payments, nf (J ) , from banks and, nf ( j ) , 
from retailers, as he owns both of them. All these funds are allocated for consumption, 
PtCtU ) , money holdings, M t(j)  , and nominal deposit holdings, PtDl+x(j)  . Thus the 
household’s intertemporal budget constraint, in real terms, is
The j  th household chooses Ct ( j ) , M t(j} /P t , and Dl+X( j ) in order to maximize his expected 
lifetime utility subject to his budget constraint and labour demand constraint. The first order 
conditions (F.O.Cs) for this optimization problem are25:
substitution for consumption, real balance and leisure. y/m and y/x represent the weight on
(2 .1)
UQ K
(2.2)
Eq. (2.1) is the usual intertemporal condition, which states that the marginal cost of fore­
going a unit of consumption in the current period must be compensated with the marginal 
benefit in the following period. Eq. (2.2) is the money demand equation.
25 The omission of households’ index in the F.O.Cs stems from the assumption following Erceg et al. (2000) and 
Christiano et al. (2005) that the implicit existence of state-contingent securities ensures households’ 
consumption and asset holding are homogenous.
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Given that the households set nominal wages in staggered contracts with a constant 
probability, 1 -  0W, of renegotiation in each period, the fraction of households who have the 
opportunity to reset their wages will set it as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution 
of leisure for consumption (A4RS) taking account the probability that he cannot reset the 
wage again. The fraction of households who don’t have the opportunity to reoptimise must 
apply the wages that was in effect in the preceding period indexed by the steady state gross 
rate of wage inflation co. This yields the following maximization problem:
M a x E ^ p O j  ^  W‘ 0 > " ;
h=0 A't ^t+h
The F.O.C for the maximization problem is
{ ( f i O j  ^ l K hN ^ h(J )M R S ,+h}
w, ( j )  = - ^ T  - 5 s------------------------------------------------- ; (2.3)
w E . ' Z n p e J  Xl+hj X l+h N l+hU)e>"/Pl+k}
h=0
Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C imply the following wage inflation curve:
& -  Bm I ^  ~ ~ @w) (n  N  * f -J. \ N
' _ A '+1 *.0 +  7 , 0  " 1- ^ '  '  ( )
where co, is the gross wage inflation and Xt is the multiplier of households’ budget constraint.
2.2.2 Entrepreneurs
The entrepreneurial sector largely follows the original BGG setup26. In each period, entre­
preneurs combine hired labour and purchased capital to produce intermediate goods in a 
constant return to scale (CRS) technology. This aggregate production function is given by
Y, = A,K, N f  ; (2.4)
26 Other similar expositions are Meier and Muller (2006), Gertler et al. (2007) and Christensen and Dib (2008).
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where Yt is produced intermediate goods, N f  is hired labour service, K t is capital purchased 
in last period and a  is capital share in production function. At is an exogenous technology 
measure capturing total factor productivity in goods sector. It follows
l n 4  = ( l - p a) ] n A  + p a ln A t_l + s al; (2 .5)
with p„ e  (0,1), £at ~ iid (0, ) . Consider an entrepreneur’s decision making at the end of
period t as an example. At that moment, the entrepreneur needs to purchase capital, Kl+X, 
that will be used in period t + l,  at the price PtQt ( Qt is the relative price of capital goods in 
terms of the consumption goods). Thus the real cost of capital acquisition is Q,Kt+x. The 
entrepreneur can only afford part o f the expenditure, equalling to his net worth NWt+x, and 
rely on external funds for the rest. This requires a model of explicit credit market and lender, 
which is the financial intermediary/bank described in details later. The capital demand of 
entrepreneurs is determined by the equality of expected marginal external financing cost with 
expected marginal return of holding capital.
X,t| (a  Ym  / K m ) + Qm  (1 -  £)
Q,
(2:6)
where 8 is the depreciation rate of capital, X, is the price of intermediate goods relative to 
final goods, and Q, , as described above, is the relative price of capital which varies because 
of the adjustment cost. Thus the expected return on capital consists of two aspects: the 
income gain of X ,a  Yl+x/K t+l and the capital gain of Qt+X( \ - S ) .  This return must be equal to 
the gross loan rate charged by financial intermediary/bank to ensure the optimal holding of 
capital by entrepreneurs.
diven the existence of credit market imperfections, the gross loan rate EtRlt+x will be equal to 
the multiplication of gross external finance premium EFPt+l and gross deposit rate EtRf+x. 
The determination of EFPt+x is shown in bank’s optimal loan production/management in the 
next sub-section. As described previously, since the bank promises to pay households a non­
state contingent nominal rate of R f , the real rate depends on the ex post inflation rate. Thus 
we would also see a debt deflation effect, a la Fisher (1933), in the credit markets. The key 
equation to show financial frictions in this model can be written as
/
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(2.7)
where nt+x = Pl+l/P, is the gross inflation rate. On the other aspect, entrepreneurial demand 
for labour service is determined by equalizing the real wage with marginal product of labour:
below. To finish the entrepreneur’s problem, it is necessary to analyse the transition of their 
net worth. The existence of credit market implies that entrepreneurs are not allowed to fully 
self finance. In other words, they cannot accumulate their net worth forever. We can achieve 
this by assuming the exit and entry of entrepreneurs out and into the entrepreneurial sector. 
The probability that an entrepreneur will survive until the next period is u (i.e. there is a 
probability 1 -  v  that he dies in between periods), so entrepreneurs only have finite expected 
horizon 1/(1 - v )  for operation. This assumption is vital, as it ensures that entrepreneurs never 
accumulate enough net wealth to finance new capital expenditure entirely and have to go to 
the credit market for external funds. The size of the entrepreneurial sector is constant, with 
new arrivals replacing departed entrepreneurs. The newly entered entrepreneurs receive some 
transferred seed money, S, , for operation27. We can derive the evolution of entrepreneurs’ net 
worth as follows:
contract signed in t - 1. As borrowers sign a debt contract that specifies a nominal interest 
rate, the loan repayment in real terms depends on the ex post real interest rate. Thus an 
increase (decrease) in inflation will reduce (increase) the real cost of debt repayment and
(2 .8)
Let’s leave the detailed exposition of financial frictions to the bank’s problem discussed
where the first term in the square bracket represents the ex post return of holding capital inf 
and the second is the cost of borrowing, which is the real interest rate implied by the loan
27 Without this seed money, entering entrepreneurs would have no net worth, and so they would not be able to 
buy any capital. Also, among the entrepreneurs who survive there are some who are bankrupt and have no net 
worth. Without a transfer they would not be able to buy capital either.
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push up (down) the entrepreneurial net worth. The stochastic nature of net worth evolution is 
introduced by a random disturbance term xt , which follows the process
In*, = Ain*,-, + s a ; (2.10)
where px € (0,1), ~ iid (0, <r2) . This random term shifts entrepreneurial net worth up
and down independently of movements in fundamentals. Christiano et al. (2010) interpret this 
shift factor as a reduced form way to capture what Alan Greenspan has called ‘irrational 
exuberanceY or simply asset price bubbles. NT follows Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) to treat 
this as a shock to the efficiency of contractual relations between borrowers and lenders so as 
to influence the degree of asymmetric information and costly state verification problem. I 
interpret this disturbance as a credit demand shock as it perturbs the financial condition of 
entrepreneurs and their demand for external finance. As shown below, this is justified by 
looking at the impulse response that xt drives aggregate level of loan and EFP into the same 
direction, a distinguished characteristic of demand shock28.
2.2.3 Banks
The function of external finance channel in the model economy is determined by financial 
intermediaries/banks. They issue deposits to collect funds from households and then convert 
those funds into lending as corporate loans to entrepreneurs. To simplify the analysis, I omit
OQany regulation of reserve or the existence of inter-bank markets . The latter justifies the 
existence of a representative bank in the model economy. The absence of reserve requirement 
and positive loan rate imply that the bank will lend out whatever is deposited: L, = Dt . 
Based on the assumption in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), the volume of loan supply 
(equivalent as the demand for deposit funds) is designed to be determined by a model of loan 
production, or more accurate, loan management, which is involved with collateral assessment 
and labour monitoring. This setup is motivated to capture the supply side of the credit market 
since in BGG the financial intermediaries exist passively to satisfy the demand of external
28 Note this explanation is not contradicted with either Christiano et al. (2010) or NT. Specifically, a positive 
shock to entrepreneurs’ net worth (asset bubble) can be thought of as a negative shock to credit demand since 
more investment can be financed internally; it can also be treated as a shock to the contractual efficiency that 
pushes down the EFP.
29This can be partly justified that the reserve requirement is mostly for demand deposit, not time deposit 
considered here. Moreover, the bank in the model is in broader sense to capture the economy-wide credit.
1
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funds by entrepreneurs. In what follows, the loan management is assumed to be conducted by 
combining the collateral for evaluation and labour effort for monitoring. The specification is 
in Cobb-Douglas fashion as follows:
A+1 = F .iQ K ^ y  N?-r; (2.11)
where Ll+l is the amount of loan lending in period r + 1 determined at the end of period t . Q, 
is the price of capital at the end of period f, thus Q,Kt+l is the value of collateral at the begin­
ning of time t + l .  N f  is the labour effort involved in loan monitoring, and y  denotes for the 
share of collateral in loan production. Ft is an exogenous technology measure capturing total 
factor productivity in banking sector (loan supply shock), following
Ini5; = ( l - p / ) ln F  + p/ ln^_, + sft ; (2.12)
with Pj e  (0,1), Ej, ~ iid(0, c r j ) . It is noteworthy that Eq. (10) distinguishes itself to the 
original setting in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) that only economy-wide capital is used 
as collateral for loan production. The reasons are twofold. First, government bond is not 
necessary here since the model refrains from the analysis of it; the omission is a simpli­
fication. Moreover, to resemble BGG’s expression of financial friction (shown below), it is 
more appropriate to exclude bond from the loan production function.
On the other hand, as described in section 2.2.2, entrepreneurs obtain the loan to finance the 
purchase of next period capital in excess of their net wealth NWl+i:
4 +i = Q<K,+\ -  ; (2.13)
Eq. Q .ll)  and Eq. (2.13) together characterize the equilibrium in credit markets.
The flow of funds of the typical FI at the end of period t is the new arriving deposit funds 
and gross interest payment on existing loans, less the labour cost for monitoring, cost of 
collateral service, the new issuing loans and the gross interest payment on existing deposits. 
The FI chooses the collateral service Q,Kl+l, labour monitoring effort N f  and newly issued 
loan Ll+l and deposit Dl+l to maximize the expected life-time value in favour of the bank 
owners, households. The profit maximization problem of the bank is given by
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max E ^ ^ { D Hh^ R !lhLHh-LlM - K A ^ -
\ 0 / + A ^ / + A + I  > ^ 7 + A »^ 7 + A + l > A + l  /  / j = 0  t / Q f
wt+h-\Nt+h-i - rL-\Qt+h-\Kt+h}
subject to the bank balance sheet constraint Lt -  Dt and loan production function Eq. (2.11), 
where ph UCt+h/UQ is the household’s stochastic discount factor. The F.O.Cs for this 
optimization problem are:
( 2 1 4 >
* ( « - < . > - ( 2 - 1 5 )
Eq. (2.14) and Eq. (2.15) apply the usual Baumal (1952) conditions, which equalize the 
marginal cost of intermediation to the factor prices of inputs divided by the marginal product 
of the inputs. As highlighted in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), this marginal cost cap­
tures the idealized net uncollateralized external finance premium (UEFP) in the model, under 
the condition that entrepreneurs come to borrow without any collateral. Thus entrepreneurs 
have to pay full cost of intermediation: labour monitoring plus collateral service. In the other 
extreme, if entrepreneurs possess the full amount of collateral to borrow, they pay the full 
cost at the same time get back the return of collateral services. Therefore, the net EFP for 
entrepreneurs is only the labour monitoring cost, which is the fraction 1 -  y  of the total cost. 
We call this the fully collateralized external finance premium (CEFP) in the model economy, 
represented as:
, CEFPm  -  1 = — •
' ,+1 L j N ?  ’
In reality, the actual amount of EFP lies between UEFP and CEFP, since entrepreneurs own 
fraction of the total collateral value in the whole economy, given by NWt+xlQtKt+x. The exact 
EFP is determined by this ratio:
NW
EFPm  - 1  = (UEFP1+t - 1)[1 -  r — ^ ] ; (2.16)
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Combine Eq. (2.16) and Eq. (2.15), after some rearrangements, to get
1 r- - , - L
EFPm - 1  = (2.17)
Eq. (2.17) highlights the key relationship between EFP and the ratio of internal funds to 
purchased capital value, NWl+l/Q tK l+l, from the bank’s optimization behaviour. Given that 
Ft and wt are exogenous, and capital price is at steady state value of unity, we can derive the 
following proposition30:
Proposition 2.1: In equilibrium, assume Ft and wtare exogenously given, and capital price is 
in steady state value. External finance premium is a decreasing and convex 
function o f  the ratio o f  net worth to purchased capital value.
This proposition implies a very important inference comparable to BGG: The external 
finance premium is higher the more entrepreneurs rely on external funds. Figure 2.1 plots the 
gross EFP against the ratio of net worth to the value of purchased capital with arbitrary 
calibration (y  = 0.77, F  = 2.69, w = 2.12):
Fig. 2.1 External finance premium and ratio of net worth to capital value
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Net worth to capital value
30 This proposition has already been shown in the last chapter. The only reason to put it here again is to make 
this chapter self-contained.
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Figure 2.1 shows that the EFP decreases as less external funds is needed with given value of 
purchased capital (less leverage) in an diminishing rate. This implies that EFP in steady state 
will increase dramatically even after you reduce the internal funds relative to capital value by 
only a small amount. This shows the mechanism of the accelerator effect embedded in the 
banking sector o f the baseline model. To see the dynamic relationship, I derive the log-linear 
form of Eq. (2.17) around the non-stochastic steady state:
f  .-KTTTrlTS -KTTTr/TS \
(nw,+1 -  k,+i -  q,)_ EFP - 1efi>, =  ~ EFP
y N W / K  y  N W / K
y N W / K  1 -  y  1 -  N W / K  ^
E F P - 1 ,„  1 j .  ; (2 ' 17L)
—— - ( w ,   -------/ )
EFP 1 - y
Eq. (2.17L) elaborates the behind the scene accelerator effect from the banking sector in the 
baseline model. The short run dynamics of EFP depends on the dynamics of the net worth to 
capital value ratio, real wage for labour monitoring and exogenous loan production tech­
nology. Thus Eq. (2.17L) is highly comparable with the counterpart reduced form equation in 
BGG framework of the form:
A
# ,+ i = - r K + i  -  k,+\ - q , ) \
BGG claims that the elasticity of external finance premium with respect to the ratio of 
internal funds to total value of capital is derived from an optimal contracting problem 
between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries. Higher net worth relative to value of 
purchased capital makes more funds of entrepreneurial sector sink into the project. Thus the 
incentives are more aligned between entrepreneurs and banks so as to reduce the asymmetric 
information problem and EFP. The baseline model with loan management also predicts a 
similar aggregate relationship as in BGG, despite the fact that the corresponding elasticity is 
shown differently by an expression nesting steady state value of EFP and internal funds to 
total value of capital ratio, and the parameter value of collateral share in loan production31. 
Besides this, the baseline model also highlights the importance of the real wage to influence
31 The elasticity in BGG equals to (// only after figuring out the optimal loan contract between entrepreneurs 
and financial intermediaries; it also depends on micro structure of the contract environment (e.g., average 
fraction of monitoring cost after the entrepreneurs default). See the appendix of BGG for details.
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the dynamics of EFP before subjecting to the exogenous shock in the banking sector32. All
these promising increments are not considered in BGG and many other studies of financial 
accelerator.
2.2.4 Capital producers
Capital producers are included to rationalize the fluctuations in the real capital price Q, , since 
the volatile asset prices contribute to the fluctuations of entrepreneurial wealth. Consider 
there are perfectly competitive capital producers in the economy to control the supply of 
capital. They combine the purchased capital and investment funds to produce new capital, K t , 
according to
with <D(0) = 0 , O 'Q  > 0 , 0 "(.) < 0 . This increasing and concave function captures the 
presence of adjustment costs in the production of capital goods. Capital producers choose the
investment expenditure in order to maximize their profit, QtKt - I , , taking the relative price 
of capital as given. The first-order condition is
- i - i
(2.18)
Here I restrict the capital production function so that the relative price of capital is unity in 
steady state. Capital producers’ decision is linked with the entrepreneurs’ capital-purchasing 
decision via the variation in the price of capital.
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
(2.19)
32 Real wage becomes relevant because it is the factor price in loan management and affects the marginal cost of 
intermediation activity.
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Note that capital is homogeneous, so there is no difference between newly-produced and old 
capital. Old capital used by entrepreneurs is rented out for the production of new capital, and 
then returned at the same price as the newly-produced capital.
that entrepreneurs sell all o f their output goods to retailers. Retailers purchase the homo­
genous wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them using a linear technology at 
no resource cost and sell as final goods to households, capital producers and the government
goods. The reason why retailers are incorporated together with entrepreneurs is to avoid the 
complication of aggregating individual entrepreneur’s demand for capital and his net worth 
when entrepreneurs themselves are imperfect competitors. Ultimately retailers’ monopolistic 
profits belong to the households who own them, in contrast to entrepreneurs who are 
independent agents possessing their own wealth. Before exploring the retailers’ problem in 
details, I firstly derive the aggregation of final goods. The final goods Yt are bundles of 
differentiated goods Yt{j)  , j  e  [0,1] , provided by the continuum of monopolistically 
competitive retailers33. The aggregation follows the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) as
where sp is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The optimal allocation of 
expenditure across differentiated goods implies a downward sloping demand function for 
goods j  :
33 Recall that the assumption of linear technology for retailers ensures that the amount o f final goods varies one- 
for-one with the amount o f wholesale goods in the economy.
2.2.5 Retailers
The retail sector is applied to introduce nominal rigidity into this economy. Here I assume
sector. In this way, the retailers have the monopolistic power to set the prices of these final
/
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where Pt(j)  denotes the price of good Yt(J) , Yt denotes the aggregate demand, and salso 
measures the price elasticity of demand among differentiated goods. Pt denotes the price 
index of final goods given by
Following Calvo (1983), and a discrete version as in Yun (1996), I assume that each retailer 
cannot reoptimize its selling price unless it receives a random signal. The probability that 
each retailer can reoptimize his price in a given period is 1 - 0 p9 independently of other firms 
and o f the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus the average length of time a price 
remains unchanged is 1/(1 -  0 ) .  Retailer j  who has the opportunity to reset its price in a 
given period t choose the price, P*(j) , that maximizes its expected discounted profits until 
the period when they are next able to change their price. On the other hand, the retailer who 
doesn’t have the opportunity to reset price must charge the price that was in effect in the 
preceding period indexed by the steady state gross rate of inflation, n . Retailer j ’s optima- 
zation problem is:
profits consists o f the probability that retailers can change their price and the households’ 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The F.O.C for the optimal problem is
MaxE, £[(00,)*% *
h =0 U c t
„ uCHh p;<j)xh -  x , ^t + h 1 t + h
subject to the demand function of Yt( j ) . Note that the stochastic discount factor for expected
00
UCl+hJ U a+h Yl+h(j)irh/ Pl+h}
{ {pop)h t / c,+A+1 / U c, M j ) X l+h}
The aggregate price index is given by
p, = +(i - e ) p ;
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Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C and aggregate price index imply the following New 
Keynesian Phillips curve:
. . (i -  pep)(\ -  0 ) .
*, = PE,*". 1 + ---------2-------- X,; (2.20L)
6 p
where %, is the log deviation o f real marginal cost from steady state.
2.2.6 Government and monetary policy
Finally I set the budget constraint for the government and the policy rule of the monetary 
authority to close the whole model. The aggregate final output goods consist of households’ 
consumption, capital producers’ investment expenditure and the government expenditure, Gt . 
Every period, the market for final goods clears as
Y, =CI + I , + G, ; (2.21)
where government expenditure is financed by lump-sum taxes and money creation 
M ^ A C ,
* D  9
r t
For monetary policy, I assume the monetary authority exogenously sets the gross growth 
rate of money, //,, such that the supply of real money balance evolves according to34
Pt-i
m t = ; (2 .22)
The money growth rate is assumed to follow a stochastic AR(1) process as
<n A = In Mi-t + smt; . (2.23)
where p m e  (0,1), £„ ~  i id (0 ,a 2m).
34 The choice o f money supply rule instead of interest rate rule is because of the large sample span from 1964 to 
2009, following NT.
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2.2.7 Equilibrium
In the baseline model economy, the equilibrium is defined as a set of endogenous variables 
{Y„ C,, /„  N f , N*,Xt, NWt, L„mn R f, Rf, nt, EFPt,X t} that satisfies households’ decision 
rules (2.1) and (2.2), wage inflation curve (2.3), entrepreneurs’ optimal conditions (2.6), (2.7) 
and (2.8), banks’ decision rule (2.17), capital producers’ optimal condition (2.18), New Key­
nesian Phillips curve derived from retailers’ problem, (2.20), resource constraints (2.4), (2.9), 
(2.11), (2.13), (2.19), (2.21), and the money growth rule (2.22). Thus the log-linear version of 
the system around the non-stochastic steady state can be derived as35:
A, = i ,+. + f," -  ; (2.1L)
9 > ,  (2 -2L)
q ' (1 0Ow)(l 0  ) r . N f A
<0, = M , ! +  q .. “ — — 77"/ +7— 77"< ) - 4  -  w-]; (2.3L)0,(1 + 1 -  W 1 -  N
y, = a , + a k , + ( l -  a)h° ; (2.4L)
X a  Y /K  „ „ « A
I^+i (2T/+i )*t+1 /+i) 9/+i 4/» (2.6L)
",*1 = -  £,+l + <#,; (2.7L)
w , = y , + Z , ~  n f ; (2.8L)
A  (™,+1 -*«) = T ^  ?  -  ( ■ £  - 1)(7 -  * , ) - ( tI t -  1 )# , + ; (2.9L)uR* " NW NW ' ' W
Lt  = f , +  A+i + n  + ( } ~  r ) K ; (2.1 i l )
r - ATK  ^ ATT
A,+i = -9, + —  "w,+l + (1 — — X +, ; (2.13L)
efp, = -
E F P _ l f  '>y N W / K  y  N W / K
I - y  N W / K  \ - y \ - N W / K
(nw„, -  -  q,)
EFP - 1  . .  1
+ - ~  (w,  f,)EFP 1 - y
{2 AIL)
q,=<p(J, (2.18L)
3S For steady state solution, please refer to chapter one.
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4 +i = 4 + ( ! - < % ; (2.19L)
(1 -  P0){ 1 -  6)  .
~ 0 Xt* (2.20L)
„ C .  I  ~
y> = y c , + ? ' ,:
(2.21L)
A  = m, -m ,_i + A; (2.22L)
;n the log-linear version of the stochastic processes
4  = a A - i (2.5L)
4  = P ftt-1 + s*-, (2.10L)
A A
ft ~ Pfft-\ + 8ft I (2.12L)
Pt ~ PmPt-\ **" 8ml j (2.23L)
Eq. (2.1L) to (2.13L) and (2.17L) to (2.23L) are the log-linear version corresponding to Eq. 
(2.1) to (2.13) and (2.17) to (2.23). Following the convention, all the variables with hat on top 
denote percentage deviations from non-stochastic steady state, where I omit the conditional 
expectations operator on the assumption of ‘Certainty Equivalence’. Using Uhlig’s undeter­
mined coefficients procedure yields a state space solution of the form36:
st+i = + Qj^z+i; (2.24)
d , = n 3s,; (2.25)
A
where the state variable vector, s t , includes predetermined and exogenous variables; d t is the 
vector of control variables; and the vector s t contains the random innovations. The 
coefficient matrices, £2, , Q 2 , and £23 , have elements that depend on the structural 
parameters of the model. Therefore, the state space solution, (2.24) and (2.25) is used later to 
construct underlying shocks and simulate the model.
36 The detailed methodological exposition is given in Uhlig (1999), whereby the Matlab programme is available 
at his homepage (http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wpol/html/toolkit.htm).
parameter values are central to my shock extraction process, I try to keep them as clo 
possible to standard choice in the literature generally, and to NT specifically. There £ 
total 25 parameters, including those characterizing the shock processes. The discount ra 
is set equal to 0.99 to match the average annual steady state real interest rate o f  4%  
elasticity o f  substitution for consumption r f , real balances r/m and leisure rfd, re a 
equal to conventional value 1.5, im plying a nearly logarithmic utility function. ] 
persistence parameter % is 0.6. The weight on real balances y/m equals to 0.0019 to mate 
average M l velocity o f  consumption. To reconcile the average working time o f around 
the weight on leisure y/x is set to 2.47. The share o f  capital in goods production fimcth 
and the capital depreciation rate 5  are fairly standard in real business cycle (RBC) liter 
to which we set value o f  0.36 and 0.025. For entrepreneurs’ surviving rate in the end ol 
period u , I will use the value o f  0.978, implying entrepreneurial average life o f  45 qua 
The next two parameters, (p and (//, are key to BGG’s financial accelerator mechanism, 
cp measures the level o f  capital adjustment cost and so the response o f  investment to si 
and y/ directly captures the degree o f  financial accelerator effect. Despite the dispute 
these two parameter values, I follow  NT to set them to be 1 and 0.037 respectively37. F< 
share o f  collateral in loan production function y , I refer to all relevant studies consid 
loan production (e.g., Goodffiend and McCallum (2007), Benk, Gillman and Kejak (2 
(2008) and (2010), and Leao (2003)). Since their chosen values for y  lie between 0.65 ( 
bound) and 0.89 (upper bound), any value between the two bounds are plausible. I pick 
value o f 0.803 to make the elasticity o f  EFP with respect to the net worth to capital ra 
the banking model match that set in NT. The parameters associated with price and 
rigidity also follow  that in NT, where the elasticity o f  demand for goods €  , and 1;
Sr
37 Originally, BGG set (p equal to 0.25 and y/ equal to 0.05. These define a relatively low level o f < 
adjustment cost and high degree o f  financial accelerator effect. Christenson and Dib (2008) used ma> 
likelihood method to estim ate the value o f  (p be 0.59 and y/ be 0.042 for US economy in the post Volck 
Meier and M uller (2006) found an even higher value o f  (p , 0.65, but insignificant y/ .
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Table 2.1 Parameters in the model
Parameter Description Value
P Household's discount factor 0.99
rjc, ’jm,nx Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 1.5
r Weight on real balances in utility 0.0019
wx Weight on leisure in utility 2.47
4 Habit persistence 0.6
a Share o f capital in goods production 0.36
8 Capital depreciation rate 0.025
Retailers' probability of not able to reset price 0.5
o w Households' probability of not able to reset wage 0.75
Goods elasticity o f demand 11
Labour elasticity o f demand 4
V Entrepreneurs' surviving rate 0.978
9 Curvature o f capital adjustment cost function 1
¥ EFP elasticity of net worth to collateral value ratio 0.037
r Share of collateral in loan production 0.803
Pa Autocorrelation o f goods productivity shock 0.95
Pm Autocorrelation of money growth rate 0.65
P x Autocorrelation of loan demand shock 0.9
P f Autocorrelation of loan supply shock 0.9
Standard deviations o f the four shocks 0.0075
sw, are 11 and 4 such that the steady state markups are 10% in the goods market and 33% in 
labour market, and the probability of not reoptimizing for price setters 6p , is 0.5 while that 
for wage setters 0W, is 0.75.
Now we have calibrated values for 17 out of the 25 parameters, the last 8 are the parameters 
capturing the process of the underlying 4 shocks. Since the shock processes are constructed in 
the next section, I give initial values for the 8 parameters in advance so that the model can be 
solved numerically. Some key steady state values in the model are also highlighted as follows.
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Table 2.2 Steady state in the model economy
Variable Definition Value
I. Steady state values
A Goods sector productivity level 1
F loan productivity level 2.15
Rd Risk-free rate 1.01
R k Gross return on capital 1.0176
R" Nominal interest rate 1.0194
7C Inflation rate 1.0092
EFP External financing premium 1.0075
N g Labour service in goods sector 0.3
N f Labour service in banking sector 0.005
II. Steady-state ratios
Y / K Output to capital 0.13
I / Y Investment to output 0.19
C /Y Consumption to output 0.61
G /Y Govt expenditure to output 0.2
L / K Leverage ratio 0.489
Nf / N Financial hour to total hour 1.7%
The external finance premium is generally unobservable in reality, hence we can only refer to 
some close indicators to pin down the steady state value. It is set to 1.0075 for 
baseline,corresponding to an annual risk spread of 300 basis points, approximating the post 
war average spread between the corporate bond rate and the three-month treasury bill rate. 
This is consistent with the estimates in Queijo (2009) and lies within the range reported in De 
Fiore and Uhlig (2005)38. The steady state quarterly gross inflation is set to 1.0092, implying 
the nominal interest rate of 1.0194. Following NT, the steady state leverage ratio of
38 In De Fiore and Uhlig (2005), the reported range for annual risk premiums on bonds and loans in U.S. is 
between 160 and 340 basis points.
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entrepreneurs is set to 48.9%, which means the ratio of net worth to value of purchased 
capital is 0.511. The steady state consumption, investment and government expenditure share 
of GDP are given by 0.603, 0.192 and 0.205, respectively to match the historical average. In 
labour market, the steady state ratio of monitoring hour relative to goods produce hour is 
1.7%. All the parameters and their calibrated values are described in table 2.1 while steady 
states are summarized in table 2.2.
2.4 Empirical Results
Based on the calibration discussed above, I carry on the evaluation of the empirical 
performance of the model. First of all, the four underlying shocks are constructed using the 
method proposed in Benk et al. (2005), (2008) and (2010) and NT. To check the robustness, 
the DSGE extracted TFP and monetary shock processes are compared to their counterparts 
derived from traditional estimation. Moreover, the two financial shocks are plotted against 
the post war recessions indicated by NBER on the one hand, and against the proxies of EFP 
on the other. The empirical performance of the model with financial shocks, both or either 
one, is evaluated by calculating second moments, historical decomposition and variance 
decomposition.
2.4.1 Construction of shocks
The assumed processes of the underlying four shocks are not appropriate for simulation until 
they are specified to be consistent with the baseline model. Two main reasons lie behind this. 
First of all, while goods sector productivity shock and monetary shock have non-controversy 
origins and can be easily backed up by conventional approach39, there are no well agreed 
counterparts for financial shocks, especially when we are considering the shocks from both 
supply and demand sides. Assuming different financial structures in the model economy 
might imply different shock processes. For instance, in Benk et al. (2008) exchange credit 
model, the autocorrelation for credit shock is 0.93, and the standard deviation of innovation is
39 Goods sector productivity shock can be estimated from constructed Solow Residuals. Monetary shock can be 
estimated by using data on money supply.
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0.019. While in Atta-Mensah and Dib (2008) of credit creation model, the two corresponding 
parameters are 0.78 and 0.047 respectively. Christiano et al. (2010) report 0.53 and 0.025 for 
the financial wealth shock in their model. Based on these, I have to estimate the financial 
shock processes independently to capture the model consistent ones. Moreover, as argued in 
Ingram et al. (1994) and studies following up, any model that is in accord with the several 
time series that make up US macroeconomic data must feature multiple shocks that are 
correlated at all leads and lags. At least we cannot avoid the possibility of the correlations 
between the innovations driving the shock process. Therefore constructing consistent shocks 
nested in the model is not only desirable, but also necessary.
To construct the four underlying shocks, the procedure in NT is adopted40, which is briefly 
described as follows. As assumed in section 2.2, the four shocks follow AR(1) processes. By 
giving initial values for the autocorrelation parameters, we can solve the model and recover 
the Markov decision rules numerically, which are written in state-space form as shown in Eq.
A
(2.24) and (2.25). The model’s endogenous control variables are stacked in vector d t , and 
the endogenous and exogenous state variables are contained in vector st . The sequence of the 
variables in 5,is ordered in such a way that the endogenous predetermined state variables 
appear first and the exogenous states follow up. Eq. (2.25) can now be written more explicitly 
as
By solving the model, we recover the two coefficients matrices, Q 31and Q 32. In this case^
data. This is straightforward from the ordinary least squares estimators for [at, f j  
via the following transformation:
d( — + £^32^ 2/
A Awe can estimate the processes of the four shocks if we assign values to dt and s u from the
(2.26)
40 Benk et al. (2005), (2008) and (2010) apply the same procedure extensively in a series o f papers. A similar 
application can also be found in Chari et al. (2007) where they are trying to realize all the underlying wedges.
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The identification of the four underlying shocks requires the data for at least four variables
A
contained in d t . More than four variables simply give an over identification estimation for 
the shocks. The choice of the preferred combination of variables is discussed below.
Given the estimated series o f the four shocks, what should be focused on next is to estimate 
each autocorrelation coefficient of the four processes. To account for the possible correlations 
between disturbances (heteroskedasticity), I apply the following seemingly unrelated 
regressions estimator (SURE)41:
A "
'Pa 0 0 0 '
“ a *
« / - l ~ ^ at
A
Mt 0 Pm 0 0
A
Mt- 1 Smt+A 0 0 Px 0 e*
A
0 0 0 P f .
A
_ s f i _
After obtaining the estimates of the first order autocorrelation coefficients for , x , , and 
f n I substitute them back to the solution algorithm to get a new matrix Q 32, then estimate 
the shock process again and proceed in an iterative fashion. Successive versions of Q 32 are 
calculated until >oa , , p x and p f  converge. Then the ultimate estimated autocorrelations
and variance-covariance matrix (VCM) are used in the solution algorithm to simulate the 
model.
As noted earlier, it should be borne in mind that the choice of the preferred combination of
A
variables contained in dt is crucial to generate robust time series o f the underlying shocks.
A
Both Benk et al. (2005) and NT argue that different combinations of variables in dt yield 
different shock processes so that it is not easy to identify how to pick up the correct bunch of 
variables. To solve this potential problem, NT proposed a rule of thumb criteria which states 
that the sensible combination should produce estimated processes for productivity shock and 
monetary shock that are highly correlated with their conventionally constructed counterparts 
from single equation estimation42. Based on this, they generate a time series for the shock to 
entrepreneurial net worth (loan demand shock) on the condition that the constructed TFP and
41 The reason why the off-diagonal elements in the autocorrelation matrix are zero will be discussed below.
42 Productivity shock is easily constructed via the detrended Solow residuals, given the data on per capita GDP, 
capital stock and labour. Monetary shock is more straightforward to recover by using the data on M l.
73
monetary shock have high correlation with their conventional counterparts: 0.76 and 0.94. I 
follow the same strategy here to estimate both the loan demand and supply shocks. During
A
the estimation, I tried different combinations of variables in dt and distinguish the most 
plausible one that gives TFP and monetary shock highly correlated with their counterparts43.
a ^  a A A A ^
In particular, I picked up six variables that are suitable from d t : [j>,, ht ,m t,h t , wt, £ t] ' . 
Note that all of them are logged and linearly detrended, refer to Appendix B for data 
description. To rationalize the choice, y , , h f  and mt are chosen to make plausible TFP and
A
monetary shock while n f  is used to capture the dynamics of credit supply shock, f t . wt and 
o)t are also included in the estimation so that the credit demand shock is recovered close to 
that in NT44.
Figure 2.2 plots the DSGE constructed and traditionally estimated TFP processes covering 
the sample period between 1964Q2 and 2009Q4. It is clear to see that the DSGE derived 
shock (solid line) mimics the traditionally estimated shock (dashed line) very well, with a 
very high correlation coefficient of 0.97 between them. On the other hand, the comparison of 
monetary shock between the two derivations (shown in figure 2.3) is less satisfied with the 
corresponding correlation of 0.76. The main discrepancy stems from the first half of the 
sample period, where the DSGE derived shock always underpredicts that from traditional 
estimation. This feature also presents in NT’s estimation of monetary shock, despite the fact 
that they have a considerably higher correlation of 0.94 between the two. Since there are no 
extant conventional counterparts of financial shock, it is currently impossible to assess the 
robustness of the estimation for financial shocks as we did for the previous two shocks. This 
also rationalizes the use o f SURE as a plausible way to get autocorrelation coefficients and 
VCM discussed above. Nevertheless, the high correlation between the previous two and their 
corresponding counterparts justifies the validity of the two financial shocks from state-space 
derivation, plotted together in figure 2.4. The estimation of entrepreneurial net worth shock 
(left axis) is closely linked with that in NT45, implying the shock construction process is not
43 Only the most plausible shock processes are plotted here while those from other combination are available 
upon request.
44 Actually, m t and wt are endogenous state variables and belong to s ll+l. Picking them up is justified since 
their values are also determined in the Markov decision rulus and can be treated equally as variables in d, •
45 Refer to figure 3 in Nolan and Thoenisson (2009).
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Fig. 2.2 DSGE and traditionally estimated total factor productivity
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sensitive to the number o f shocks. This shows a one step further validation o f the loan 
productivity shock (right axis) generated here.
The time series properties o f the four shocks can be summarized as follows. First o f all, the 
first order autocorrelation coefficients for the four shocks are p a = 0 .9433 , p m = 0 .4 1 8 9 , 
p x = 0 .9 7 9 6 , and p f  = 0 .8 2 1 6 . The two financial shocks (demand and supply sides) are 
both more persistent than the growth rate o f M l, but straddle the TFP shock. The net worth 
shock is more persistent than TFP while the loan productivity shock is less persistent. This 
ordering is consistent with that described in NT for the three shocks (excluding loan product- 
vity) on the one hand and here on the other for the two shocks (TFP and money) derived from 
conventional estimation46. Turning to the VCM o f the disturbances, both o f the two VCM 
from DSGE construction and from traditional estimation are shown below:
VCMdsge= 10"4x
0.4123 
0 .1823 
0 .1718 -1 .0 3 8 7
0.1823 0.1718 -0 .9 2 8 8
2.4582 -1 .0 3 8 7  1.8035
1.0586 -0 .0 6 4 8
-0 .9 2 8 8  1.8035 -0 .0 6 4 8  23.1235
VCMrra= 10"4 x
0.3965 0.1145 
0.1145 2.3861
 TFP (DSGE) Con=0.97
-  — -  TFP (Traditional)
1 9 7 0 1 9 8 01 9 6 5 1 9 7 5 1 9 8 5 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 5 2000 2 0 0 5
46 The conventional derived shocks show that TFP is more persistent than the growth rate o f M l, with 
pa = 0 .9 5 5 6 , pm = 0 .6097.
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Fig. 2.3 DSGE and traditionally estimated monetary shock
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The comparison between DSGE constructed and traditionally estimated VCM shows that 
both o f the DSGE TFP and money growth are slightly more volatile than their traditional 
counterparts. Moreover, the two are positively correlated in the two cases while the corre­
lation between the DSGE derived ones is a little higher. The positive correlation between 
TFP and money growth is indicative o f an historical accommodation o f  supply-side shocks 
by the Fed. Now focus on the VCM of DSGE constructed disturbances per se. The loan 
productivity (supply shock) is negatively correlated with TFP, but positively correlated with 
money growth, im plying the loan supply side is m ore accom m odative to m onetary 
condition47. On the other hand, the net worth shock is negatively correlated with money 
growth (consistent with NT), but positively correlated with TFP (by contrast with NT). It 
seems more favourable to positive correlation between TFP and asset bubble since asset 
prices always burst during recessions. The negative correlation to money growth implies that 
the Fed goes against asset price bubbles48. It is noteworthy that the correlation between loan 
productivity and net worth shock is slightly negative ( -  0.0648xlO-4), for which it shows the 
identification o f supply side from demand side shock in credit markets. The volatilities o f the
47 Benk et al. (2008) constructed an exchange credit shock process that also possesses positive correlation to 
money growth and negative correlation to TFP as the loan productivity extracted here. This shows a way of 
consistency despite that their shock is to consumption credit and my shock is for investment.
43 There is a literature focusing on whether the central bank should respond to asset price when conducting 
monetary policy. See Bernanke and Gertler (1999).
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Fig. 2.4 DSGE estimated net worth and loan productivity shocks
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four shocks are ordered consistently to relevant studies in the literature. The net worth shock 
is more volatile than TFP but less volatile than money growth; in line with NT. The loan 
productivity is the most volatile one; also appears in Benk et al. (2005). This can be possibly 
understood by the fact that shock in a specific sector is much more volatile than TFP which is 
an aggregate shock that results in the smoothing o f all the idiosyncratic shocks from different 
sectors.
It would be interesting to relate the DSGE extracted shocks with the post war NBER business 
cycle reference dates, which track recessions starting at the peak o f a business cycle and 
ending at the trough. Figures 2.2 to 2.4 also highlight the 7 main recession episodes in the 
sample between 1964Q2 and 2009Q4 (including the most recent recession triggered by the 
sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007): 1969Q4-1970Q4, 1973Q4-1975Q1, 1980Q1-1980Q3, 
1981Q3-1982Q4, 1990Q3-1991Q1, 2001Q1-2001Q4 and 2008Q4-2009Q4 (end o f sample). 
Figure 2.4 shows an apparent picture that every recession happened when both o f the 
entrepreneurial net worth and loan production are in contraction. This is a fairly striking 
result, implying only one o f the two financial shocks, either demand or supply side, is not 
strong enough to cause an economy-wide recession. For instance, the non recession era such 
as (1964-1965), (1985-1987) and (1992-1994) witness a contraction o f entrepreneurial net 
worth while the loan productivity is in expansion. The boom in the supply o f credit offsets 
the contraction in entrepreneurial sector and avoids economy-wide recessions. The reverse is
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Fig. 2.5 DSGE extracted financial shock(net worth) and EFP proxies
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also true as shown in the recession episodes o f 1973Q4-1975Q1 and 1981Q3-1982Q4 that the 
economic down-turn ceases earlier because the entrepreneurial sector recovers sooner than 
the credit supply. It is noteworthy that the recent recession could have recovered earlier since 
the loan supply started to expand during 2008 before the breakdown o f Lehman Brothers, 
which reverse the credit expansion into a deeper contraction, as shown in the red line of 
figure 2.4. This implication is also apparent in Hirakata et al. (2010)49. On the other hand, the 
ink between the peaks and troughs o f the business cycle and the realized TFP and money 
growth shocks is less obvious than the financial shocks, o f  which is also present in NT.
To assess the validity o f the DSGE constructed financial shock, NT also plot it against the 
proxy o f external finance premium, the spread between AAA rated corporate bonds and the 
3-month Treasury bill rate, and find a strong negative correlation between the two. Here the 
same assessment procedure is followed, where both the loan productivity and net worth shock 
are plotted against the proxies o f  EFP. The spread o f AAA rated corporate bonds as well as 
that of BAA and high yield bonds are used as the proxies50. Figure 2.5 and 2.6 plot the HP- 
filtered net worth and loan productivity shock respectively against the three HP-filtered 
proxies.
49 Refer to the figure 4 o f their constructed shock processes with Bayesian approach.
Gertler and Lown (1999) argue that the high-yield bond spread emerges as a particularly useful indicator of 
the external finance premium and financial conditions more generally in the last two or three decades.
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The two figures indicate that both o f the two shocks are significantly negatively correlated 
with the three proxies o f  EFP. With stronger correlation, it seems that larger fraction o f the 
cyclical EFP is accommodating the demand side o f credit market. Nevertheless, the supply 
side effect shouldn’t be ignored completely. It is also found that the loan productivity leads 
those spreads for two or three quarters since the correlation between contemporaneous 
spreads and lagged loan productivity is higher in absolute value (not shown here), though the 
increment is fairly small (to about -0.37). This feature is not appearing for net worth shock. 
The corresponding correlation between TFP and spreads, or money growth and spreads is 
fairly weak: (-0.03 to -0.13) and (0.14 to 0.21).
2.4.2 Impulse responses to financial shocks
This section briefly examines the impulse responses o f  the model economy to the two 
financial shocks. Figure 2.7 and 2.8 plot the responses o f six variables that are attractive: 
output, investment, loan, capital price (Tobin’s q), net worth and external finance premium. It 
is apparent that the two negative shocks both drive down the economy as expected. The effect 
o f the net worth shock is very strong and persistent; the economy goes to downturn for a very 
long period, as shown in NT. The responses to loan supply contraction is relatively weak, but 
still significant. The effect is also less persistent as the economy reverts back to steady state 
quickly. One interesting thing to notice is that the responses o f loan volume are in opposite
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Fig. 2.7 Impulse responses to financial shock (net worth)
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direction subject to the two shocks which are in the same direction. This rationalizes the 
earlier claim that the entrepreneurial net worth shock behaves more like a credit demand 
shock, while the loan productivity resembles a supply shock. Subject to a negative shock to 
net worth, the wealth o f entrepreneurs contracts hugely because o f the persistent effect; drops 
much deeper than that o f capital demand. This makes the demand for external funds larger 
than before, pushing up the EFP. Thus a negative shock to net worth behaves like a positive 
shock to loan demand, driving up loan (quantity) and EFP (price) simultaneously. On the 
other hand, a negative shock to loan productivity resembles a credit supply contraction, 
accom panied  w ith  d ec lin ing  loan volum e (q u an tity ) and increasing  EFP (p rice).
2.4.3 Second moments
Comparing the second moments o f the model simulated series with the moments o f the 
erhpirical series from the data is the traditional way to evaluate the performance o f  the 
business cycle models. Here I follow this strategy to assess how the business cycle perfor­
mance o f the model is altered after we add in the two financial shocks individually on 
the one hand and together on the other51. Table 2.3 summarizes the second moments o f  the
51 The statistics for the model without financial frictions are not compared since Nolan and Thoenissen (2008) 
have done that extensively.
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key variables from data (1964:1-2009:4) and compares them with the data generated by four 
models (estimates from 100 repeated stochastic simulation) that are identical except that: 
Model 1 has both financial shocks; Model 2 wipes out the supply sided financial shock; 
Model 3 gets rid o f the net worth shock; Model 4 has no financial shock52.
For the volatility part, as shown in panel A, the models with financial shocks, either one or 
both, come closer to data for output, investment, loan, hours, M l, inflation and EFP. Among 
the models with financial shocks, Model 3 comes closer to data for consumption, investment, 
real wage while Model 2 better matches for loan, hours and M 1. For EFP, Model 3 performs 
as well as Model 2. The latter reconciles with the result highlighted in Nolan and Thoenissen 
(2008). There are two variables that all the models fail to predict the moments completely. 
One is the net worth for which all the models overpredict by 4 to 8 times; the other one is the 
nominal interest rate where all types predict less than 10% to the empirical counterpart.
I
For the correlation with output, as shown in panel B, all the models (Model 1 to Model 4) 
correctly predicts the sign o f the correlation with GDP for consumption, investment, hours, 
M l, inflation, EFP and net worth. For nominal interest rate, Model 1 and 2 can predict the 
correct sign while Model 3 and 4 fail. None o f the four models predict the sign for loan and
52 The shocks in Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4 are constructed separately by the same methodology described 
above.
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Table 2.3 Second Moments (Data 1964Q2 to 2009Q4)
Variables Data Model 1(NW&LP shock)
Model 2
(NW shock only)
Model 3 
(LP shock only)
Model 4 
(No F_ shocks)
A. Volatility
% S.D. Relative to output % S.D.
Relative 
to output % S.D.
Relative 
to output % S.D.
Relative 
to output % S.D.
Relative 
to output
Output 1.58' 1.00 1.60 1.00 1.61 1.00 1.57 1.00 1.54 1.00
Consumption 1.29 0.82 1.56 0.97 1.60 0.99 1.41 0.90 1.41 0.92
Investment 5.26 3.33 8.12 5.07 8.19 5.09 4.14 2.64 3.88 2.52
Loan 2.29 1.45 1.74 1.09 1.84 1.14 1.05 0.67 1.14 0.74
Hours 1.88 1.19 2.07 1.29 2.03 1.27 2.41 1.54 2.34 1.52
Real wage 0.97 0.61 0.76 0.48 0.75 0.47 0.91 0.58 0.91 0.59
Real Ml 3.21 2.03 2.57 1.61 2.63 1.64 1.98 1.26 1.98 1.29
Nominal rate 0.41 0.26 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01
Inflation 0.29 0.18 0.53 0.33 0.52 0.32 0.72 0.46 0.72 0.47
EFP 0.35 0.22 0.43 0.27 0.33 0.20 0.33 0.20 0.16 0.10
Net worth 2.25 1.42 17.04 10.65 17.23 10.70 8.59 5.47 8.10 5.26
B. Contemporaneous correlation with output (S.E.)
Consumption 0.87 0.34(0.14) 0.34(0.12) 0.96(0.01) 0.97(0.01)
Investment 0.90 0.82 (0.05) 0.81 (0.05) 0.95(0.01) 0.96(0.01)
Loan 0.26 -0.24(0.16) -0.24(0.13) -0.17(0.15) -0.17(0.14)
Hours 0.86 0.86 (0.03) 0.86 (0.03) 0.86 (0.04) 0.85 (0.04)
Real wage 0.14 -0.05(0.15) -0.03(0.13) -0.28(0.15) -0.25(0.16)
Real Ml 0.14 0.19(0.14) 0.19(0.13) 0.95(0.01) 0.96(0.01)
Nominal rate 0.38 0.19(0.15) 0.34(0.12) -0.10(0.09) -0.12(0.09)
Inflation 0.15 0.40 (0.09) 0.37 (0.09) 0.69 (0.05) 0.67 (0.05)
EFP -0.65 -0.72 (0.07) -0.77 (0.06) -0.64 (0.08) -0.90 (0.03)
Net worth 0.58 0.81 (0.06) 0.80 (0.06) 0.94 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02)
real wage correctly despite that both variables have nearly acyclical behaviour. On the quanti­
tative perspective, Model 1 and 2 underpredict the correlation with output of consumption, 
investment while Model 3 and 4 overpredict. All the four versions of the model overpredict 
the correlation for M l, inflation and net worth. The only variable that all the four models 
capture perfectly simultaneously is hours. EFP, the most important variable in this study, is 
captured better by models with financial frictions and Model 3 performs best.
Comparing across models with and without financial shocks reveals mixed results in the 
performance assessment. The contribution o f financial shocks is not straightforward to 
identify. This complements some recent findings that financial accelerator plays limited role
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Fig. 2.9 Historical decomposition of EFP
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in the model’s transmission mechanism53. The main contribution of financial shocks in terms 
of matching the data’s second moments over the sample period is the ability to match the 
second moments of the EFP. For both the volatility and correlation with output, Model 3 with 
loan productivity shock on top of TFP and monetary shock performs the best. Although 
Model 1 and 2 are not far away from Model 3, the importance of supply side financial shock 
to determine the dynamics of EFP is revealed clearly.
2.4.4 Historical decomposition of EFP
To further confirm the conjecture from previous section that the loan productivity shock 
plays an important role in determining the dynamics o f EFP, this part decomposes the 
variation of cyclical EFP into the four underlying shocks. Figure 2.9 displays the time path of 
AAA spread (EFP proxy) and the contribution of each structural shock. The solid black line 
is the data of cyclical AAA spread from 1964Q2 to 2009Q4. Red and blue bars refer to the 
contribution of monetary and TFP shock respectively while green and purple bars representi
the contribution of the two financial shocks; net worth and loan productivity. The effect 
of TFP to the cyclical AAA spread is minor. The contribution of monetary shock seems 
larger, but still moderate. This can explain why the second moments (both the volatility and 
correlation with output) generated by model excluding financial shocks are far away from 
their empirical counterparts. The figure clearly shows that the seven notable economic
53 See Meier and Muller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008) who use strict econometric testing.
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Table 2.4 Variance decomposition
Variables Percentage owing to:
TFP Money growth Net worth Loan productivity
Output 8.72% 34.78% 51.07% 5.42%
Consumption 19.84% 46.86% 20.95% 11.00%
Investment 1.96% 21.85% 71.16% 5.02%
Loan 18.86% 17.97% 56.89% 6.33%
Hours 13.69% 32.99% 48.40% 4.93%
Nominal rate 12.63% 32.98% 52.07% 2.31%
Inflation 27.01% 34.14% 32.90% 5.94%
EFP 3.63% 16.68% 53.92% 25.76%
Net worth 2.16% 21.85% 71.16% 5.02%
recessions within the sample period, 1969Q4-1970Q4, 1973Q4-1975Q1, 1980Q1-1980Q3, 
1981Q3-1982Q4, 1990Q3-1991Q1, 2001Q1-2001Q4 and 2008Q4-2009Q4, corres-pond well 
with the episodes when the AAA spreads are around cyclical peaks. Meanwhile, the cyclical 
peaks are contributed mostly by the two financial shocks. Each recession episode is com- 
panied by the situation when both of the two financial shocks predict a high EFP. The recent 
financial crisis is a notable case such that the EFPs driven by net worth as well as loan 
productivity are both unprecedentedly high. On the other hand, if the two shocks predict 
different sign for EFP, the AAA spread is only moderate and the economy is not in recession 
(e.g., mid 1980s and mid 1990s). After combining figure 2.4 and 2.9, it is fair to claim that 
both of the two shocks from financial sector are significant and important to determine the 
cyclical behaviour of EFP.
2.4.5 Variance decompositions
In this section, I measure the contribution of each of the four shock processes to EFP as well 
as other key macroeconomic time series. Here I follow the procedure applied in Hirakata et al. 
(2010). Table 2.4 reports the variance decompositions for output, consumption, investment, 
loan, hours, federal funds rate, inflation, EFP and net worth54. It is apparent that the net worth 
shock accounts for the largest fraction of variation for output, investment, loan, hours, federal
54 In calculating the variance decompositions, I first calculate the volatility of the endogenous variable 
conditional on each of the shocks, and then sum these volatilities to calculate the share of each shock.
84
funds rate, EFP and net worth itself. These results are in line with that in NT, predicting the 
net worth shock is the dominant force for the variation of above variables. Not surprisingly to 
see the fluctuations of inflation is mainly determined by the monetary shock, which is the 
genuine natural cause of inflation. For EFP, we can still find the significant influence from 
the loan productivity shock, despite the main dominant force is still net wealth shock. About 
one third of the total effect on EFP from financial sector comes from the supply side of the 
credit market.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I make one step further based on the previous chapter to quantitatively assess 
the role played by the shocks originated from the banking sector in the U.S. business cycle. 
Specifically, I build a model that generally follows the setup of BGG and NT except for the 
banking sector, where I replace the optimal contracting problem of BGG with an explicit 
profit maximization problem in the banking sector subject to a loan production function. In 
consequence, both the demand side (entrepreneurial sector) and supply side (banking sector) 
of the credit market contribute to the financial frictions. In the model context, four exogenous 
shocks, including two conventional structural shocks (TFP and monetary) and the two 
financial sector shocks (entrepreneurial net wealth and loan productivity), are constructed by 
combining the data and the model’s linear state-space solution. The shock to the technology 
in loan production resembles the disturbance originating in the banking sector. Together with 
the shock to entrepreneurial net wealth, we can analyse the contribution of the disturbance 
from both the supply and demand side of the financial market.
The main results can be summarized as follows. First of all, the DSGE extracted TFP and 
monetary shock are observationally similar to their counterparts constructed with traditional 
estimation while entrepreneurial net worth shock is close to the one constructed in NT. 
Secondly, every post war recession is crashed with the situation that both the entrepreneurial 
net worth and the loan productivity shock are in contraction; either one of them is not strong 
enough to cause an economy-wide recession. Thirdly, both of the extracted loan productivity 
and net worth shock are negatively correlated with proxies of EFP. Fourth, the variance
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decomposition indicates that loan productivity shock is an important source of EFP variation, 
though the dominant driving force is still net worth shock. Finally, net worth shock is still a 
dominant factor even after we include the loan productivity shock.
This study rationalizes one interesting point raised in NT that the entrepreneurial net worth 
shock remains contractionary after recessions have ended. This is because the shock from the 
other side of the credit market, the loan productivity, starts the expansion. Another notable 
point from the analysis is subject to the recent economic recession. The terrible economic 
downturn could stop earlier since the loan supply is found to expand during 2008. However, 
the breakdown of Lehman Brothers reverses the credit expansion into a deeper contraction. 
This point is still searching for the empirical support.
For future research, it is always attractive to incorporate the banks’ balance sheet condition 
into the analysis. The importance of bank capital, either for the transmission mechanism or as 
an independent source of aggregate fluctuations, is still under exploration.
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Chapter 3
Banking Capital in Loan Management 
and Bank’s Balance Sheet Channel of 
Transmission Mechanism
i
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3.1 Introduction
In the empirical literature, vast evidences suggest that the credit market imperfections play an 
important role in the transmission mechanism of the economy to both nominal and real 
structure shocks. These evidences have motivated extensive attempts to model the financial 
frictions and relevant transmission mechanism in theoretical frameworks, especially in state- 
of-the-art dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) environments. Up to date, models 
including credit market imperfections can be categorised as three distinct types: (i) the 
corporate balance sheet channel, focusing on the demand side of the credit market (i.e., 
borrowers’ financial position and its effect on the external finance premium (EFP) that 
borrowers face); (ii) the bank lending channel, arising from the supply side of the credit 
market (e.g., banks finance loans in part with liabilities that carry reserve requirements); and 
more recently, (iii) the bank capital channel, also emphasizing the supply side such that 
monetary policy affects bank lending through its impact on bank capital (e.g., banks’ balance 
sheet)55.
The earlier model devices related to bank lending channel and the borrowers’ balance sheet 
channel were dictated by the empirical findings of the relevance of these two channels in 
monetary transmission mechanism (e.g., Bemanke and Blinder (1988), Kashyap and Stein 
(1994) among others, for bank lending channel; Hubbard (1995), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) 
among others, for corporate balance sheet channel56). In DSGE setting, the literature has so 
far focused mainly on the demand side of the credit market, modelling the financial accele­
rator working via corporates’ balance sheets. As reviewed in previous chapters, key notable 
contributions include Bemanke et al. (1999), BGG hereafter, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) for closed economy and Gertler et al. (2007) in open economy 
context. These frameworks mainly emphasize the importance of entrepreneurial stake in the 
corresponding economic activity because of the asymmetric information and cost o f state 
verification (CSV), but are silent about banks’ balance sheet in determining the cost of 
external finance and the impact on the propagation of the business cycle.
55 As both the bank lending channel and the bank capital channel build on the hypothesis that monetary policy 
works, in part, by affecting banks’ supply of loans, they are sometimes treated as part o f a broader bank 
lending channel, notwithstanding being based on different transmission mechanisms.
56 Also see Bemanke and Gertler (1995) for a review.
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The reason why the exposition of the effect from banks’ balance sheet status in shaping credit 
market frictions and aggregate fluctuations is not in research agenda until very recently 
comes from the lack of early evidences in favour of that mechanism. Empirical studies during 
the 1990s mostly failed to find support for the bank balance sheet channel. In part this was 
because the methodology was unsuitable insofar as it focused on aggregate data, which can 
be misleading57.
More recently, a new empirical approach based on microdata studies on individual loan 
agreements in the US (Hubbard et al. (2002)) finds that bank capital is important for banks’ 
decisions on the loan interest rate in financial distress. Series of papers in Angeloni et al. 
(2003), also find empirical relevance of banks’ balance sheets in the monetary transmission 
mechanism in most euro-area countries. Besides these, other relevant empirical studies try to 
distil whether bank capital affects banks’ supply of loans and real activity. Kishan and Opiela 
(2000, 2006), Van den Heuvel (2002), Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004), for instance, show 
that the real effects o f monetary policy are generally stronger when banks are small and low- 
capitalized. Hubbard et al. (2002), in turn, find that, even after controlling for information 
costs and borrower risk, the capital position of individual banks affects the interest rate at 
which their clients borrow. Moreover, recent financial turmoil unquestionably has underlined 
the importance of analyzing the link between banks’ balance sheets and economic activity.
Based on these, since the middle of 1990s till now, quite a few papers have been searching 
for the rationale for the bank capital channel of transmission mechanism. The first thing to 
sort out is the motivation of bank capital holdings. The majority of the theoretical bank 
capital channel literature focuses exclusively on bank capital requirements imposed by 
banking regulation. Blum and Hellwig (1995), who have pioneered this approach, argue that 
a rigid link between bank capital and bank lending imposed by regulation may amplify the 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Given that banks cannot issue new capital and that firms do not 
fully replace bank loans by other sources of finance, if the aggregate banking sector confronts 
negative return shock, all the banks become undercapitalized and have to decrease lending 
subject to the regulatory capital adequacy requirement. An alternative explanation for the
S7 Aggregate number for credit can be misleading since funds do not flow freely from banks with excess capital 
to banks with capital shortages. Moreover, using aggregated data does not adequately control for loan demand, 
thus failing to isolate the loan supply effects.
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decrease in bank loan supply during bad times, under regulatory capital requirements, rests 
on banks’ exposure to the interest rate risk. Given that some long-term bank assets involve 
fixed interest rates whereas the returns of many short-term bank liabilities are closely linked 
to market interest rates, an increase in the interest rate after a contractionary monetary policy 
and, consequently, an increase in the bank’s cost of funding leads to a decrease in the bank’s 
profits, under the maturity mismatch on the bank’s balance sheet, weakening the bank’s 
future capital position and thus increasing the likelihood that its lending will be constrained 
by an inadequate level of capital. See this kind of analysis in Van den Heuvel (2002) who 
concludes that the lending of constrained banks overreacts to the monetary policy shock, 
compared to unconstrained banks.
The assumption of no equity issuance is the key to let regulatory bank capital requirements 
take effect in above studies. Some other expositions also consider regulatory capital require­
ments, but assume that banks may issue equity. However, equity issuance involves costs, as 
in Bolton and Freixas (2006) for instance, who introduce a cost of outside capital for banks 
by assuming information dilution costs in the issuance of bank equity: outside equity 
investors, having less information about the profitability of bank loans, tend to misprice the 
equity issues of the most profitable banks. In such a context, binding capital requirements 
may magnify the effects of a contractionary monetary policy, because this policy may cause a 
decrease in bank capital, as bank loans become insufficiently lucrative when information 
dilution costs in bank equity issuance are taken into account.
On the other hand, some studies also consider the market force of bank capital requirements 
instead of regulation. As defined by Berger et al. (1995), market capital requirements are 
associated with capital ratio that maximizes the value of the bank in the absence of regulatory’ 
capital requirements. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) treat the role of bank capital in a different 
way, featuring two sources of moral hazard problem both between entrepreneurs and banks as 
well as between banks and depositors (households): entrepreneurs can choose different 
projects and have an incentive to undertake the riskier projects in order to enjoy private 
benefits, thus be required to invest their own net worth in the project by banks so that they 
wouldn’t go after those private benefits; meanwhile, banks may not dutifully monitor 
entrepreneurs because it is costly and publicly unobservable, in the case of which households
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also require banks put their own net worth (bank capital) in the lending funds. As delegated 
monitors for depositors, banks must then be well capitalized to convince depositors that they 
have enough stake in the entrepreneurs’ projects.
This double moral hazard framework is further developed by Chen (2001), Aikman and 
Paustian (2006) and Meh and Moran (2010) in dynamic general equilibrium environment to 
explore how bank capital transmits structural shock to the whole economy and, consequently, 
makes the response of the economy more amplified and persistent. One common feature 
within them can be summarized as follows. When negative shock hits the economy, both the 
banks and entrepreneurs’ net wealth deteriorates at the same time market requires both of 
them finance a larger share of investment projects on their own. Because banks and 
entrepreneurs’ net worth are largely predetermined, bank lending must decrease to satisfy the 
market requirements, thereby leading to a decrease in investment. This, in turn, affects 
negatively banks and entrepreneurs’ earnings and also their net worth in the future, leading to 
the propagation o f the initial shock over time.
Another interesting approach is proposed by Sunirand (2003), who also supports the bank 
capital amplification hypothesis. He applies the CSV framework of Townsend (1979) to two 
financial contracts, both between entrepreneurs and banks and between banks and depositors. 
Banks act as delegated monitors on entrepreneurs’ investment projects and depositors 
perform the role o f ‘monitoring the monitor’. The two-sided CSV leads to a wedge between 
the internal and external cost of funds that motivates endogenous roles for both firm’s and 
bank’s net worth condition in the model. He concludes that embedding the information asy­
mmetry between households and banks into the financial accelerator model strengthen the 
amplification and propagation mechanism.
From the brief review above (summarized in table 3.1), we can summarize that the bank 
capital channel thesis overall predicts that the introduction of bank capital requirements, 
either for regulatory or market reasons, tends to amplify the effects of monetary and other 
exogenous shocks. However, in most of those models in favour of market determined bank 
capital requirements, the main motivation is to deter the moral hazard behaviour from 
borrowers because of the information asymmetries between them and lenders.
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Table 3.1 Summary of theoretical models with bank capital channel
Studies Capital requirements Effect of shocks on the economy
Chen (2001) Market Amplified and more persistent
Sunirand (2003)
Aikman and Paustian (2006)
Market
Market
Amplified with the introduction of a double CSV 
approach
Amplified and more persistent with the 
introduction of an asymmetric information 
problem between depositors and banks and 
between banks and firms
Meh and Moran (2007) Market More persistent
Blum and Hellwig (1995) Regulatory Amplified with the introduction of binding CR
VandenHeuvel (2002) Regulatory Amplified the standard interest rate channel of MP
Bolton and Freixas (2006)
Markovic (2006)
Aguiar and Drumond (2009)
Regulatory
Regulatory
Regulatory
Potential amplifying effect of MP: tightening in 
MP causes decreases of incentives to raise bank 
capital causes further decline of lending 
Amplification of output response to a 
contractionary MP
Amplifies monetary shocks through a liquidity 
premium effect on the EFP faced by firms
This chapter considers the market force of bank capital requirements from a different 
perspective. This is motivated by the importance of factors within the banking sector to affect 
the banking capital channel, but lack of attention is paid on it. I specify a typical functional 
form of loan production in the banking sector and assume bank capital is necessary because it 
is one of the factors that help the banking sector produce or manage loans. In such setting, the 
bank capital or the bank’s balance sheet condition can also play a role in determining the 
transmission mechanism of the economy confronting exogenous shocks. For instance, after a 
negative shock hitting the economy, the entrepreneurial sector’s net wealth deteriorates 
quickly and more external financing is needed. Higher amount of loans must be accompanied 
with more bank capital according to the loan production function. Since issuing bank capital 
is more costly than issuing deposit, banks can only increase the loan rates to cover the higher 
cost of operation. Facing higher external finance premium, more investment and production 
are cut and the net worth of entrepreneurial sector deteriorates even further, propagating the 
decline of economic activities from the initial shock.
Absent from the explicit modelling of information asymmetry or moral hazard problem, the 
role of banking capital in loan production is sufficient to generate the relevant transmission 
mechanism. In this framework, not only the demand side (e.g., corporate balance sheet 
condition), but also the supply side of credit market condition (e.g., bank capital) is under the
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spotlight. They interact with each other and build up an even stronger transmission 
mechanism. It is noteworthy to bear in mind that in the previous two chapters financial 
frictions which stem from the cost of loan management conducted in financial intermediaries 
also shed light on the supply side of credit market, but are silent about bank capital. This 
chapter fills this gap and contribute a little bit along the literature.
The detailed exhibition of the financial frictions from the model is shown in the following 
sections while the brief summary is provided here. After the derivation, the financial friction, 
expressed in the external finance premium, is shown to depend on three things: the ratio of 
entrepreneurial net worth to total capital value (corporate balance sheet condition); the ratio 
of bank capital to lending funds (bank’s balance sheet condition); and the difference between 
the return on bank capital and the return on deposit. The former one follows the claim from 
the previous chapters that holding of collateral help mitigate the entrepreneurs’ payment for 
the cost associated with loan management. The latter two stem from the role of bank capital 
in loan production, and, consequently, in the transmission mechanism. The difference 
between bank capital return and deposit return is defined as liquidity premium. This is 
rationalized by the assumption that deposit can fulfil the liquidity needs from households, 
thus bank capital must offer a higher pecuniary return to attract the holding of it. Given that 
the bank’s liability composition is constant, the higher is the liquidity premium, the larger is 
the EFP. Similarly, given that the liquidity premium is constant, EFP is larger when higher 
proportion of loans is produced or financed with bank capital.
Virtually similar strategy of modelling bank capital channel is in Markovic (2006) and 
Aguiar and Drumond (2009). Markovic (2006) develops a model that can account for three
bank capital channels: (i) the adjustment cost channel, which builds on the allocation cost
\
necessary to reduce the asymmetric information problem; (ii) the default risk channel, which 
arises from the possibility of banks defaulting on their capital; and (iii) the capital loss 
channel based on the assumption that, during a recession, banks’ shareholders anticipate a 
future fall in the value of bank capital. All channels trigger an increase in the required return 
on bank capital by shareholders, and thus an increase in the cost of bank capital. Current 
model shares some common features with that in Markovic (2006). For instance, I also 
assume holding bank capital is subject to adjustment cost such that the adjustment cost
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channel and capital loss channel are embedded implicitly in current model. However, 
Markovic’s model motivates the bank holding of capital from regulatory basis while the 
current model from market force. Moreover, the current model excludes the possibility of 
bank default and attributes to the liquidity premium for the return differential between bank 
capital and deposit, which is the common strategy I share with Aguiar and Drumond (2009). 
But they concentrate more on how Basel Accord, the capital regulation, can contribute to a 
procyclical banking sector.
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. An active bank capital 
channel in the model amplifies and propagates the monetary policy shocks (demand shock) 
while attenuates and dampens the technology shocks (supply shock) when households’ 
deposit is contracted in nominal term. This result stems from the so called ‘Fisher deflation 
effect’ channel initiated by Fisher (1933). The Fisher and bank capital effect mechanisms 
reinforce each other in the case of shocks that move the price level and output in the same 
direction (demand shock), and they tend to cancel each other in the wake of shocks which 
move the price level and output in opposite directions (supply shock). On the other hand, it is 
shown that adverse shocks that cause persistent declines in bank capital value, can lead to 
sizeable declines in bank lending and economic recession.
The rest o f this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 derives the construction of bank 
capital channel in transmission mechanism. Section 3.3 completes the whole model with 
other agents and defines the general equilibrium. Section 3.4 calibrates the model to quarterly 
data of US economy. Section 3.5 shows the results and relevant discussions. Section 3.6 
concludes with some final remarks.
*
3.2 Construction of bank capital channel
In this model environment, the function of external finance channel is determined by banks. 
They issue deposits and bank equity shares to collect funds from households and convert 
them to lending as the corporate loans to entrepreneurs. Bank capital is necessary because it
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is assumed to be one factor to produce entrepreneurial loans58. Different from the previous 
chapters, deposit fund instead of money is assumed to generate utility for households because 
of the liquidity it provides. To simplify the analysis, I omit any regulation of reserve or the 
existence of inter-bank markets. The latter justifies the existence of a representative bank in 
the model economy. The absence of reserve requirement and positive loan rate imply that the 
bank will lend out both the deposit and equity funds in order to maximize the market value. 
Thus the bank’s assets and liabilities are summarized by the following table of the balance 
sheet:
Table 3.2 Balance sheet for banks
Assets Liabilities
Loans: Lt Deposits: Dt
Equity: QtzZ,
and the balance sheet constraint is given by
L,= D t + g z , -  (3.1)
Following the assumption made in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), GM hereafter, the 
volume of loan supply is designed to be determined by a model of loan production, or more 
accurate, loan management. In the original setting from GM, loan management is involved 
with collateral assessment and labour monitoring, while here I add in one more factor, the 
bank equity. The bank equity can be treated as a securer against bank assets. I model it in the 
loan production function to follow the spirits of regulatory bank capital requirements (e.g., 
Basel Accord) indirectly. This setup is motivated to capture the supply side of the credit 
market in determining the financial frictions through the banks’ balance sheet channel. In 
BCj G  loan equals to deposit; there is no bank capital involved. In their model banks’ balance 
sheet is not relevant in determining the credit market imperfections. To resolve this limitation, 
bank capital is modelled to be necessary in loan management in current chapter. Specifically, 
the loan management is assumed to be conducted by combining the labour effort, collateral 
and bank equity. The functional form is in Cobb-Douglas fashion as follows:
58 Bank capital and bank equity are used interchangeably.
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(3.2)
where Lt+l is the amount of loan lending in period f + 1 determined at the end of period t . Qkt
and Qzt are the price of physical capital and bank capital respectively at the end of period t, 
thus QkKt+l is the walue of collateral at the beginning of time / +1. N f  and QzZt+l are the 
bank labour and equity involved in loan production. y1, y2 and 1—yl —y2 denote for the 
shares of the three factors. Ft is an exogenous technology measure capturing total factor 
productivity in banking sector (loan supply shock), following
with p f  e  (0,1), s ft ~  iid(0,<Jf) . Eq. (3.2) is the cornerstone to generate the financial 
friction in this framework. Since managing loans is costly, involving labour, collateral and
funds to cover the managerial cost. It is also noteworthy that by contrast to GM, Eq. (3.2) 
only uses economy-wide capital, not government bond, as collateral for loan production. The 
reasons are twofold. First, government bond is not necessary here since the model refrains 
from the analysis of it; the omission is a simplification. Moreover, to make the expression of 
financial friction partly observationally equivalent to that in BGG (shown below), it is appro­
priate to exclude bond from the loan production function.
The instantaneous profit of the bank at the end of period t can be expressed as the new 
arriving deposit and equity funds and gross interest payment on existing loans, less the labour 
cost for monitoring, cost of collateral service, the new issuing loans and the gross payment to 
existing deposits and equities. The bank chooses the collateral Q,Kl+l, labour service N f ,
newly issued loan Lt+l, deposit Dt+l, and equity Q?Zt+l to maximize the expected life-time\
profit in favour of the bank owners, households. The profit maximization problem of the bank 
is given by
In^ = (1 -  /?/ ) ln F  + p f \nF,_{ + s fi ; (3-3)
bank capital, there is a spread between the price of loan and the price of bank’s source of
^ l+ h  >Qt+k^l+h+l >^ 7+1 A + l  Q t  ^7
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subject to the bank balance sheet constraint Eq. (3.1) and loan production function Eq. (3.2), 
where J3h UCt+h/UCt is the household’s stochastic discount factor. One notable thing here is that 
in the maximization problem R?‘ denotes for the interest rate charged on uncollateralized 
loans because the price on loans should cover all the collateral costs in loan management. 
Since entrepreneurs own fraction of the economy-wide collateral, part of the return on 
collateral goes towards entrepreneurial sector, helping mitigate the cost of external funds. The 
details are shown below. The first order conditions (F.O.Cs) for this optimization problem are:
< 3 -4 )
( 3 ' 5 )
F ( R u l—Rd \ = ____ E‘^  ~ ^ +1^ ________________  ('i c \
M ( \ - r - n ) L j ( g z My  (36)
Eq. (3.4) and (3.5) apply the usual Baumal (1952) conditions, which equalize the marginal 
cost of intermediation to the factor prices of inputs divided by the marginal product of the 
inputs. Eq. (3.6) equalizes the ratio of bank equity spread to loan spread, the uncollateralized 
external finance premium (UEFP), to the marginal product of equity in loan management, 
implying the key relationship between EFP and the rest of the economy derived below. As 
shown in previous chapters, this marginal cost of intermediation is assumed to be equal to the 
net UEFP, not the practical external finance premium. To cover the marginal cost caused by 
labour, collateral and bank capital, the bank would charge each unit of loan the amount of the 
marginal cost on top of that it pays to households. Thus the total marginal cost of interme­
diation is identical to the UEFP. However, in reality, entrepreneurial sector owns part of the 
ectpnomy-wide collateral which can help mitigate the practical EFP charged on the loan funds. 
Thus the actual amount of EFP is smaller than UEFP because o f the fraction of the total 
collateral value owned by entrepreneurs, given by the ratio NWm /Q*Km . Thus the exact EFP 
is related to UEFP according to the following:
NW
EFPt- 1= (UEFPt - 1)[1 -  y2 TprrH; (3.7)
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y2N W jQ *K M *{UEFPt - \ )  measures the fraction of collateral return on loan management 
service distributed to the entrepreneurial sector. Combine Eq. (3.6) and (3.7) can achieve:
1 , O z7  N W
EFP, - 1 = 7 — 1------E,{Rlx i±L] (3.8)
i - f t -r z  L,*\ Q,K,+1
Eq. (3.8) highlights the determination of the financial friction stemming from the interaction 
of both corporate balance sheet and banks’ balance sheet channel that the practical EFP 
depends on three distinct factors: the ratio of entrepreneurial net worth to total capital value; 
the ratio of bank capital to lending funds (assets); and the difference between the return on 
bank capital and the return on deposit. The former is related to corporate balance sheet effect 
while the latter two determine the relevance of banks’ balance sheet. We can see clearly that 
EFP is positively related to entrepreneurial leverage ratio (one minus the ratio of net worth to 
capital value), bank equity to lending ratio and the liquidity premium (difference between 
bank capital return and deposit return). To see the near steady-state dynamics, take the log- 
linear form of Eq. (3.8):
^  E F P - 1 R z EF P - 1 R d E F P - l ,„ z „efp  - - r ------------------------ - r  +  (a +z  _ /  )
EFP R z - R d EFP R z - R d EFP ' '
E F P -I  y2N W /K  ,  .  (^3 '8L -)
EFP \ - y 2N W !K  ‘ '
It is noteworthy that by contrast to the previous chapters, the corporate balance sheet here 
doesn’t seem to be relevant to determine the marginal cost of intermediation per se. This 
stems from the derivation that corporate balance sheet is substituted out by liquidity premium 
and bank capital ratio. The entrepreneurial net wealth is effective only because it influences 
the fraction that UEFP can be mitigated when the cost is passed through to entrepreneurs59.
Finally, I should define a functional form for the price of bank capital as I assume there is 
adjustment costs of varying bank capital holdings. Markovic (2006) argues that this definition 
is necessary to model his capital loss channel. From empirical evidence, the price of bank
59 Despite that the corporate balance sheet channel is relatively weak in current model, it wouldn’t be 
problematic any more if  we add it to the BGG financial accelerator mechanism, which is fairly strong. The 
combination of BGG corporate balance sheet channel and bank capital channel emphasized here is subject to 
future research.
/
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shares moves broadly in line with the price of other non-financial firms’ shares, which in this 
model should be reflected in the value of entrepreneurial net wealth. Thus I follow the 
functional form assumed in Markovic (2006) that in the log-linear terms, the expected price 
of bank capital depends on the weighted average of current price of bank capital and expected 
price of firm shares. This is given by
£,<?,+! = P ( t^  +(^-Poz)E,mvn i; (3.9L)
3.3 General equilibrium
Besides the banking sector, the economy also comprises other five types of agents:
(i) Households, who set nominal wage, supply labour to wholesale goods sector and banking 
sector in monopolistic competitive labour markets, consume and allocate their savings to 
bank deposits and bank capital; (ii) Entrepreneurs, who need external finance to buy capital, 
which is used in combination with hired labour to produce wholesale output; (iii) Capital 
producers, who combine old capital and investment funds to produce new capital and sell to 
entrepreneurial sector; (iv) Retailers, added in order to incorporate inertia in price setting; (v) 
Government, who conducts both monetary and fiscal policy.
3.3.1 Households
The economy comprises a continuum of infinitely lived monopolistically competitive risk- 
averse households, indexed by j  e  [0,1], o f length unity. To motivate the nominal wage 
inertia, each household supplies differentiated labour service to entrepreneurial and banking 
sector, which regard each of their labour service as an imperfect substitute for that of others. 
In this setup, entrepreneurs and banks demand bundles of labour services, which is obtained 
using the aggregation scheme as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
. > 1;N ,= b f , U )  C- dj
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The optimal substitution across labour service leads to the following labour demand equation 
regarding the j  th labour service
N t U )  = N ,
where Wt (j ) is the nominal wage set by the j  th household, Wt is the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate 
nominal wage given by Wt -  [^Wt( j ) x~Swd j f {X~ew), and o g iv e s  the constant elasticity of 
substitution across labour service.
On top of the above, each household also consumes and invests the savings in assets which 
include deposits, that pay a nominal riskless rate of return between t - 1  and t of R?_x, and 
risky shares of ownership of banks in the economy, that pay real return Rzt . Varying bank 
equity holding is subject to adjustment cost in order to capture the short run variation of bank 
capital price. The j  th household chooses consumption (with external habit) and the asset 
portfolio to maximize the expected lifetime utility (appropriately discounted) subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint (in real terms) that reflects interperiod allocation possibilities. 
Specifically, the household’s problem is given by
max Q -.M * ] .
l - 7 ‘ r  1 - n d r  1 - r j*  J ’
subject to
C, (;•)+q tl (7)+Q;znl ( j ) + f [ a  (Z' ^  Z'(J))]2 =
2 Q ,Z , ( j )
w, ( j)N ,  ( j ) + ^  D, ( j ) + R;Q;Z, ( j ) + T, ( j ) + n , ( j)  ’
i _
where C,(J) denotes the j  th household’s real consumption, C, the aggregate consumption, 
r f , rjd and r f  measure the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption, deposit 
and leisure. ^ rfand y /x represent the weight on deposit and leisure in the utility function. 
Dt+l(j)  stands for the deposits (in real terms) held from t and t + \ ,  Z t+l( j ) the bank equity' 
held from t and t + l ,N , ( j ) the hours worked, wt(j)  the real wage, T,( j)  the lump sum taxes,
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IT, (j)  the dividends, p  e  (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. Real deposits are included in 
the instantaneous utility function to indicate the existence of liquidity services from wealth 
held in the form of that asset. Compared to bank capital, deposits have an advantage for 
households in terms of liquidity. The F.O.Cs for households’ optimization problem are60:
UQ = 0El{UQil&-}+UBHl; (3.10)
^t+\
\ 2
Ua & ,^ + X ( = f - m = P E ,{ U CnlQ A + ^ ( Z t+2
\  Z t+1 J
-1)]}; (3.11)
Eq. (3.10) describes the equilibrium trade-off between consumption and holding deposit in 
terms of utility, which states that the utility loss of giving up a unit of consumption in the 
current period must be compensated with the utility gain of holding deposit, including the 
liquidity yield as well as the discounted pecuniary yield in the following period. Eq. (3.11) 
shows the intertemporal condition of holding bank equity after taking the adjustment cost into 
account.
Finally, given that the households set nominal wages in staggered contracts with a constant 
probability, 1 -  6W, of renegotiation in each period, the fraction of households who have the 
opportunity to reset their wages will set it as a mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution 
of leisure for consumption taking account the probability that he cannot reset the wage again. 
The fraction of households who don’t have the opportunity to reoptimise must apply the 
wages that was in effect in the preceding period indexed by the steady state gross rate of 
wage inflation, co. This yields the following maximization problem
M axE^KpeJ I f -  W' 0 > * N M ] .
i h=0 \  *t+h
The F.O.C for the maximization problem is
60 The omission of households’ index in the F.O.Cs stems from the assumption following Erceg et al. (2000) and 
Christiano et al. (2005) that the implicit existence of state-contingent securities ensures households’ 
consumption and asset holding are homogenous.
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3.3.2 Entrepreneurs
In each period, entrepreneurs combine hired labour and purchased capital to produce 
intermediate goods in a constant return to scale (CRS) technology. This aggregate production 
function is given by
where Y, is produced intermediate goods, N f  is hired labour service, Kt is capital purchased 
in last period and a: is capital share in production function. A, is an exogenous technology 
measure capturing total factor productivity in goods sector. It follows
with p a e  (0,1), s at ~ iid(0,cr^). At the end of period t , the entrepreneur needs to purchase 
capital, K t+X, that will be used in period/+ 1, at the price Q*. The entrepreneur can only 
afford part of the expenditure Q?Kl+l, equalling to his net worth NWt+x, and rely on external 
funds from banks for the rest. The capital demand of entrepreneurial sector is determined by 
the equality of expected marginal external financing cost with expected marginal return of 
holding capital.
where 8 is the depreciation rate of capital, X, is the price of intermediate goods relative to 
final goods. The expected return on capital consists of two aspects: the income gain of 
X ,a  Yl+l/K l+l and the capital gain of Q*+l ( l - £ ) .  This return must be equal to the real gross 
loan rate to ensure the optimal holding of capital by entrepreneurs.
(3.13)
ln 4  = (1 -  pa) \s\A  + pa\n 4 -i + Eat; (3.14)
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Given the existence of credit market imperfections, the gross loan rate EtRlt+l will be equal to 
the multiplication of gross external finance premium EFPt+l and the real cost of deposit funds 
as described above. The determination of EFPl+l has been shown in bank’s optimal loan 
management in the previous section. The equation that shows financial frictions in this model 
can be written as
E 'R '^ E r f^ E F P ^ E X r , (3.16)
where R f equals to the real opportunity cost of internal funds after taking into account the 
inflation effect. Entrepreneurial demand for labour is determined by equalizing the real wage 
with marginal product of labour:
w, (3.17)
The last part of entrepreneurial problem is the transition of the net worth. The existence of 
credit market dictates that entrepreneurs are not allowed to fully self finance. In other words, 
they cannot accumulate their net worth forever. We can achieve this by assuming the exit and 
entry of entrepreneurs out and into the entrepreneurial sector. The probability that an entre­
preneur will survive until the next period is u(i.e. there is a probability 1 - 1> that he dies in 
between periods), so entrepreneurs only have finite expected horizon 1/(1 - u )  for operation. 
This assumption is vital, as it ensures that entrepreneurs never accumulate enough net wealth 
to finance new capital expenditure entirely and have to go to the credit market for external 
funds. The size of the entrepreneurial sector is constant, with new arrivals replacing departed 
entrepreneurs. The newly entered entrepreneurs receive some transferred seed money, St , for 
operation61. We can derive the evolution of entrepreneurs’ net worth as follows:
' NWhI =iARtkQ ,_ ,K ,-R fE F P X Q ^ K ,-N W l) ] + ( \ - v ) S r> (3.18)
where the first term in the square bracket represents the ex post return of holding capital in t 
and the second is the cost of borrowing.
61 Without this seed money, entering entrepreneurs would have no net worth, and so they would not be able to 
buy any capital. Also, among the entrepreneurs who survive there are some who are bankrupt and have no net 
worth. Without a transfer they would not be able to buy capital either.
/
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3.3.3 Capital producers
Capital producers are included to rationalize the fluctuations in the real capital price Qkt , 
since the volatile asset prices contribute to the fluctuations of entrepreneurial wealth. 
Consider there are perfectly competitive capital producers in the economy to control the 
supply of capital. They combine the purchased capital and investment funds to produce new 
capital, K t , according to
K t = O
K,
K ,;
with 0 (0) = 0 , O 'Q  > 0 , 0 % )  < 0 . This increasing and concave function captures the 
presence of adjustment costs in the production of capital goods. Capital producers choose the 
investment expenditure in order to maximize their profit, Q*Kt , taking the relative price 
of capital as given. The first-order condition is
(3.19)X
Here I restrict the capital production function so that the relative price of capital is unity in 
steady state. Capital producers’ decision is linked with the entrepreneurs’ capital-purchasing 
decision via the variation in the price of capital.
The aggregate capital stock evolves according to 
* , + ( ! -  S)K, (3.20)
Note that capital is homogeneous, so there is no difference between newly-produced and old 
capital. Old capital used by entrepreneurs is rented out for the production of new capital, and 
then returned at the same price as the newly-produced capital.
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3.3.4 Retailers
The retail sector is applied to introduce nominal rigidity into this economy. Here I assume 
that entrepreneurs sell all of their output goods to retailers. Retailers purchase the homo­
genous wholesale goods from entrepreneurs, differentiate them using a linear technology at 
no resource cost and sell as final goods to households, capital producers and the government 
sector. In this way, the retailers have the monopolistic power to set the prices of these final 
goods. The reason why retailers are incorporated together with entrepreneurs is to avoid the 
complication of aggregating individual entrepreneur’s demand for capital and his net worth 
when entrepreneurs themselves are imperfect competitors. Ultimately retailers’ monopolistic 
profits belong to the households who own them, in contrast to entrepreneurs who are 
independent agents possessing their own wealth. Before exploring the retailers’ problem in 
details, I firstly derive the aggregation of final goods. The final goods Yt are bundles of 
differentiated goods Yt(j)  , j  e  [0,1] , provided by the continuum of monopolistically 
competitive retailers62. The aggregation follows the framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) as
where sp is the elasticity of substitution between different goods. The optimal allocation of
wfaere Pt(j)  denotes the price of good Yt(j)  , Yt denotes the aggregate demand, and sralso 
measures the price elasticity of demand among differentiated goods. Pt denotes the price 
index of final goods given by
expenditure across differentiated goods implies a downward sloping demand function for 
goods j :
62 Recall that the assumption of linear technology for retailers ensures that the amount o f final goods varies one- 
for-one with the amount of wholesale goods in the economy.
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Following Calvo (1983), and a discrete version as in Yun (1996), I assume that each retailer
each retailer can reoptimize his price in a given period is 1 -  Op, independently of other firms 
and of the time elapsed since the last adjustment. Thus the average length of time a price 
remains unchanged is 1/(1 -  0 ). Retailer j  who has the opportunity to reset its price in a 
given period t choose the price, that maximizes its expected discounted profits until
the period when they are next able to change their price. On the other hand, the retailer who 
doesn’t have the opportunity to reset price must charge the price that was in effect in the 
preceding period indexed by the steady state gross rate of inflation, n . Retailer j ’s optima- 
zation problem is:
profits consists of the probability that retailers can change their price and the households’ 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The F.O.C for the optimal problem is
cannot reoptimize its selling price unless it receives a random signal. The probability that
M a x E ^ i i p e , )
subject to the demand function of Yt( j ) . Note that the stochastic discount factor for expected
00
E, £  { (/?* ,) Uct+h+i
1 t  W *  u « . hJ U c,+h ’
00
The aggregate price index is given by
p,
Log-linear approximations of the F.O.C and aggregate price index imply the following New 
Keynesian Phillips curve:
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X, =  PEf i ,+1 +
(1 -  pep\ \  -  ep) .
n ; (3.21L)
where %t is the log deviation of real marginal cost from steady state.
3.3.5 Government and monetary policy
Finally I set the budget constraint for the government and the policy rule of the monetary 
authority to close the whole model. The aggregate final output goods consist of households’ 
consumption, capital producers’ investment expenditure and the government expenditure, G, . 
Every period, the market for final goods clears as
The monetary authority conducts monetary policy by controlling the gross nominal interest 
rate R? . Following Taylor (1993) and related studies thereafter, I assume that the central 
bank adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to deviations of inflation n t and output Yt ,
Where p r captures the empirical interest rate smoothing, k k and k  are the elasticity of 
nominal interest rate with respect to deviations of inflation n t and output Yt , and srt is an 
exdgenous random shock, with zero mean and standard deviation crr , to the interest rate,
(3.22)
where government expenditure is financed by lump-sum taxes
from their steady state values, with certain degree of interest rate smoothing. The log-linear 
version of monetary policy rule is
r" =  PrK-X +  (1 -  P r ) l* * X ,  +  Kyy,} +  e » (3.23)
reflecting either failure to track the rule or intentional transitory deviations from the rule 
(policy shock).
!
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3.3.6 Equilibrium
In this extended model that involves bank capital channel, the equilibrium is defined as a set 
of endogenous vandfo\es{Yt,Ct,In Kn Dt,Z n NWl,N f  ,N ^  ,wt,a>t,7rt,R* ,R f ,Q*,Qf} which 
satisfies the EFP determination rule (3.8), the functional form of bank capital price (3.9), 
households’ decision rules (3.10) and (3.11), wage inflation curve (3.12), entrepreneurs’ 
optimal conditions (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17), capital producers’ decision rule (3.19), price 
inflation curve (3.21), monetary policy rule (3.23), and resource constraints (3.1), (3.2), 
(3.13), (3.18), (3.20) and (3.22).
Steady state solution
Before moving to the calibration of the model, it is useful to look at the steady states of the 
model economy. The model’s non-stochastic steady state system is characterized by above 
equilibrium conditions in non time varying fashion.
To solve the system, we can follow the method of continuous substitution. Start with the 
steady state version of Eq. (3.11), we have
R! = j ,  (3-1 IS)
Since the difference between Rz and R d stems from the liquidity premium L.P. , we have
L.P.
where the value of L.P. is given in the calibration section. Following Eq. (1.20) and Fisher 
Equation, we have
Rk = R d xEFP; (3.16S)
Rn= R d x7t-,
\
Meanwhile, we also have the following from Eq. (3.21):
£ - 1
X  = -*~
s p
(3.2 IS)
Then according to Eq. (1.19), we achieve
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The above attainment predicts
Y Y/K Y/K
L L / K . 1 - N W / K ’
On the other hand, based on Eq. (3.7), we find out UEFP equals to
E E P  1
UEFP = 1 + -------------— ; (3.7S)
1 - y 2 N W / K ’ v ;
assuming we know the steady state value of EFP and N W/ K.  Thus combine Eq. (3.4) and 
(3.17) to eliminate real wage w , we get
N °  1 - a Y X 
N f ~ Y\ L U E F P - Y
where Y/L , X and UEFPare given already. Since N °  + N F = N ,  we know:
NF = N ° / N * + l i a B i N O = N - N F i
The next step is to combine Eq. (3.15S) and (3.13) to get
i
N G
K
Y_l_ 
K A
1 - a
where Y / K  is given in Eq. (3.15S). Then we can easily calculate the steady state capital stock 
K , output Y,  and the rest variables of the model. Some key steady states are shown in table 
3.4.
Log-linear approximation
Taking a log-linear approximation of the equilibrium system around non-stochastic steady 
state gives:
(3.1L)
L  =f, +YiK\+Yi%+r,%+ ( i- r ,-y 2)(V i+ # ) ;  (3.2L)
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EFP- 1 R ’ EFP- 1 R“ , E F P -lefp, =--------------- jr 'i-------------------rr.,, H---------(o, +z. - / , )
£FP  R z - R  1 EFP R‘ - R 4 EFP
E F P -1 y2N W / K  , „
e f F T ^ n w Jk  ' ~ q' '
(3.8L)
‘J/ti =Pez^  + O -P 0!>™',+i ; (3-9L)
+£,(&■ - £ ) + £ , ( 4 i - * )= # (* , (3.10L)
l * \j/^ Ty~^  77^  a *
- 3 - ^  + «,„/■  4  = 4 +i +^" -  ^ 1 ;  (3.11L)jfiR* ' jSAR*
A ^  A ( 1 —  P&J){Y — Qw ) p  ,  A (5 T V  A /V  ^  A -|
<y, = ^ /+1 + -—  —-----—foX------w, + -------- « , ) - 4  “ W/]; (3.12L)
0W(1+*7,,O l-JV 1-JV ' ,J’  ^ '
j), = a t +ak t_x+([-(x)ht ; (3.13L)
= X ^ £ ( .  - 4 ‘ ,; (3.15L)
& = « £ ,+ ? -*«i  (3.16L)
wt = Xt +yt -hf;  (3.17L)
—L-hw - . 2 ^ _ ( - 2 ^ . —1){r” — ^  + efpt_\}+« W i; (3.18L)
ui?* N W  NW
qt =  (pijt - k t_x) ;  (3.19L)
*, = 4  + {\-S)kt_x ; (3.20L)
/>* , ^ i T  x = M +i +    ; (3.21L)
j > . = 7 « < + £ ? ;  (3.22L)
K = P,K-\ + 0  -  Pr)VKn^ l + Kyy,} + Er, \ (3.23L)
Eq. (3.1L) to (3.2L), Eq. (3.8L) to (3.13L) and Eq. (3.15L) to (3.23) are the log-linear version 
corresponding to Eq. (3.1) to (3.2), Eq. (3.8) to (3.13) and Eq. (3.15) to (3.23). Following the 
convention, all the variables with hat on top denote percentage deviations from non­
stochastic steady state, where I omit the conditional expectations operator on the assumption
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o f ‘Certainty Equivalence’. Using Uhlig’s undetermined coefficients procedure yields a state 
space solution of the form63:
*^+1 =  ^ 1^ / ^ 2^ + 1» (3*24)
d t = Q 3st (3.25)
/V
where the state variable vector, s t , includes predetermined and exogenous variables; d t is the 
vector of control variables; and the vector s t contains the random innovations. The 
coefficient matrices, Qj , H 2 » a°d ^ 3  , have elements that depend on the structural 
parameters of the model. Therefore, the state space solution, (3.24) and (3.25), is used to 
simulate the model later when showing the results.
3.4 Calibration
Before using the log-linear system above to simulate the model, it is necessary to set values 
to all the structural parameters. In what follows, I set parameter values to calibrate the model 
to quarterly data of the post war US economy. Since most of the structural parameters are 
standard and identical to that in previous chapters, I set them equal to the originally calibrated 
values. More attention is paid to newly introduced parameters and steady state values that are 
relevant to the banks’ balance sheet channel.
The first two steady states for which we should set values are the ratio of bank capital to 
assets (loans) and the liquidity premium in the banking sector; these two values are relevant 
fo bank capital channel. One should bear in mind that the minimum Basel capital requirement 
is 8%, but the actual bank capital ratio is higher than that for most banks. They hold some 
buffer of equity above the regulatory minimum, so as to lower the risk of an adverse shock
X
leading to capital inadequacy in the future. Meh and Moran (2010) calibrate the bank capital 
ratio to be 14% based on the 2002 average risk-weighted capital-asset ratio of US banks. On 
the other hand, Van den Heuvel (2008) gets a lower value of 10% from the data spanning 
from 1993 to 2004. Thus I pick a plausible value of 12% that is the average from these two
63 The detailed methodological exposition is given in Uhlig (1999), whereby the Matlab programme is available 
at his homepage (http://www2.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/institute/wpol/html/toolkit.htm).
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studies. The liquidity premium should be calibrated with some caution. Since the model 
abstracts from any default risk of holding bank equity, the difference totally stems from the 
liquidity disadvantage of bank equity. For this reason, Aguiar and Drumond (2009) equalize 
the return on bank equity to the return to firm equity and Van den Heuvel (2008) uses the 
data on subordinated bank debt to measure the liquidity premium. I follow the estimation of 
Van den Heuvel (2008) and set the liquidity premium to be 3.16% annually in steady state. 
These two steady state values, together with the EFP and entrepreneurial leverage, help fix 
the share of bank equity in loan production function from Eq. (3.8). The parameter governing 
the persistence of bank capital price is set to 0.78, in line with the estimation in Markovic 
(2006)*4.
The rest structural parameters and steady states are almost identical to those in previous 
chapters. The discount rate /? is set to a lower value of 0.985 than before. This is to match 
the average annual steady state bank equity return of 5.92%. Combine this with the liquidity 
premium can reveal the annual return on deposit of 2.76%. The elasticity of substitution for 
consumption r f , deposit r f  and leisure r f  are all set to 1.5, implying a nearly logarithmic 
utility function. Habit persistence parameter £ is 0.6. To reconcile the average working time 
of around 30%, the weight on leisure i//xi s set to 2.47. The share of capital in goods 
production function a  and the capital depreciation rate 8  are set to 0.36 and 0.025. For 
entrepreneurs’ surviving rate in the end of each period, u , I use the value of 0.9728, implying 
entrepreneurial average life of 36 quarters. The parameter <p that measures the level of 
physical capital adjustment cost is set to 0.5 while the one for bank capital adjustment cost is 
0.3. The share of collateral and labour in loan production function are 0.65 and 0.24 
respectively, implying the share of bank equity to be 0.11. This value is fairly close to the 
corresponding one 0.096 in Gillman and Kejak (2010), who also put bank capital in credit 
production function. The parameters associated with price and wage rigidity also follow the 
literature, where the elasticity of demand for goods s p , and labour ew, are 11 and 21 such 
that the steady state markups are 10% in the goods market and 5% in labour market, and the 
probability of not reoptimizing for price setters 6p , is 0.5 while that for wage setters 6W, is
64 Markovic (2006) originally estimates this for UK, but mentions that the result in US is very close.
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Table 3.3 Parameters in the model
Parameter Description Value
P Household's discount factor 0.985
Intertemporal elasticity o f substitution 1.5
v d Weight on deposit in utility 0.0019
if/x Weight on leisure in utility 2.47
z Habit persistence 0.6
a Share o f capital in goods production 0.36
8 Capital depreciation rate 0.025
Retailers' probability o f not able to  reset price 0.5
ow Households' probability o f not able to  reset wage 0.75
Sp Goods elasticity of demand 11
Labour elasticity o f dem and 21
V Entrepreneurs' surviving rate 0.9728
<p Curvature o f physical capital adjustment cost function 0.5
Zz Curvature o f bank capital adjustment cost function 0.3
7 Share of collateral in loan production 0.65
Pa Autocorrelation o f goods productivity shock 0.95
Pr Interest rate smoothing 0.9
Elasticity o f policy rate to inflation deviation 1.5
Ky Elasticity o f policy rate to  output deviation 0.1
P<Qz Persistence o f bank capital price 0.78
0.75. For the parameters regarding the monetary policy reaction function, I generally follow 
Clarida et al. (2000) and set the interest rate smoothing parameter p r equal to 0.9, and the 
policy response to inflation and output deviation, kx and k  , to 1.5 and 0.1, respectively.
The key steady state values in the model are also highlighted as follows. The external finance 
premium is set to 1.0075 for baseline, corresponding to an annual risk spread of 300 basis 
points, approximating the post war average spread between the corporate bond rate and the 
three-month treasury bill rate. This is consistent with the estimates in Queijo (2009) and lies
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Table 3.4 Steady state in the model economy
Variable D efinition Value
I. Steady state values
A Goods sector productivity level 1
Rd ' Deposit rate 1.0069
R2 Bank equity return 1.0152
R k Gross return on capital 1.0148
R n Nominal interest rate 1.0162
7t Inflation rate 1.0092
EFP External financing premium 1.0075
N g Labour service in goods sector 0.3
n f Labour service in banking sector 0.005
II. Steady-state ratios
Y / K Output to capital 0.13
I / Y Investment to  output 0.19
C / Y Consumption to  output 0.61
G / Y Govt expenditure to output 0.2
L / K Leverage ratio 0.5
Z / L Bank capital ratio 0.12
n f / n Financial hour to  total hour 1.6%
within the range reported in De Fiore and Uhlig (2005)65. The steady state quarterly gross 
inflation is set to 1.0092, implying the nominal interest rate of 1.0162. The steady state 
entrepreneurial leverage ratio is set to 50%, which means the ratio of net worth to value of 
purchased capital is 0.5. The steady state consumption, investment and government 
expenditure share of GDP are given by 0.603, 0.192 and 0.205, respectively to match the 
historical average. In labour market, the steady state ratio of monitoring hour relative to 
goods produce hour is 1.6%. All the parameters and their calibrated values are described in 
table 3.3 while steady states are summarized in table 3.4.
65 In De Fiore and Uhlig (2005), the reported range for annual risk premiums on bonds and loans in U.S. is 
between 160 and 340 basis points.
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3.5 Results
This section presents the main findings about the link between the bank capital channel and 
the model’s transmission mechanism subject to exogenous shocks. I generally consider the 
impulse responses of the economy to two conventional shocks prevailing in the literature: 
goods technology shock (supply side) and monetary policy shock (demand side). The latter is 
corresponding to the monetary transmission mechanism which attracts lots of attention from 
the policy makers. I also consider the effects o f independent shocks from the banking sector 
itself, defined as the large and persistent fall in bank equity value. This is to resemble the 
economy-wide write-off of non-performing loans in general, and the recent global financial 
crisis in particular, which can be simulated as a large deterioration of the banking sector 
balance sheet. It would be interesting to see the response of the whole economy to such shock.
3.5.1 Technology shocks
Figure 3.1 presents the effects of a one-standard deviation positive technology shock on two 
versions of the model economy. The first version corresponds to an active bank capital 
channel and is labelled the With BCC economy. Its responses to the technology shock are 
shown in solid lines. The second version of the model economy is similar to the first one 
except that the bank capital channel is turned off. Since the bank capital channel is active 
through the liquidity premium effect and the bank capital ratio variation, we can shut the 
channel down by cut off the connection between EFP and the above two. This economy is 
labelled the Without BCC and its responses are displayed in dashed lines.
In the impact period, the rise in the technology drives up the marginal product of capital and 
stimulates the demand for capital, which in turn pushes up investment and the price of capital. 
Wb clearly see the jump of output, consumption and investment from the diagram. However, 
here the banking friction generates an attenuation effect, dampening the technology shock. 
This comes from the debt deflation effect, where the decline of inflation associated with 
supply shock raises the real debt burden, depressing the net worth for entrepreneurial sector. 
The decline in net worth accompanied by the rise of loan, which is stimulated by the positive
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Fig. 3.1 Impulse responses to technology shocks
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supply shock, pushes up the leverage ratio and the need to raise bank capital. This generates 
higher cost o f bank intermediation (liquidity premium) and requires higher EFP, which 
attenuates the effect o f  initial shock and dampens the following propagation as well. This 
result is consistent with the recent literature (e.g., Christenson and Dib 2008, Christiano et al. 
2010) assuming nominal contract. Thus we see a reverse order o f response in figure 3.1. The 
no friction version (not reported) would give the highest initial impact which is also in effect 
for longest period. The model economy with bank capital channel attenuates the most, more 
than the version without banks’ balance sheet effect. Finally, the positive supply shock leads 
to deflation. In reaction, monetary authorities follow a loose policy after the onset o f the 
shock, acting as an additional force to stimulate the economy. However, this doesn’t overturn 
the attenuation effect.
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Fig. 3.2 Impulse responses to monetary policy shocks
Output Consumption Investment Entrep net worth
5 10
Deposit
at0 6
I  0.4
I  0.2
0.5
-0.5
0 5
Nominal Int rate
10 o 5
Inflation
10
Q uarter
0.2 o
0.1 -0.1
-0.2
10 0 5 10
Liquidity prem iumEFP
0.088 0.04 0.06
0.04c 0.02
0.02
0 5 10 0 5 10
Q uarter
o
■1
-2
•3
0 5
Bank equity
10
o 5 10
Bank capital ratio
Q uarter
•With BCC  Without BCC
6
4
2
0
-2
0 5 10
0 5 10
Physical capital
0 5 10
Bank equity price
0 5 10
Physical capital price
o 5 10
Net worth to capital value
Q uarte r
3.5.2 M onetary policy shocks
The monetary transmission mechanism is usually analysed by exploring the economy’s 
impulse responses to a policy innovation. In order to assess the importance o f  channels 
through which actions o f  policymakers affect the economy, I simulate the impulse responses
o f the economy to a temporary increase in the policy rate o f  1% per annum. Figure 3.2{
presents the responses to a one-standard deviation negative monetary policy shock, for the 
bank capital channel economy (solid lines) and for the no bank capital channel economy 
(dashed lines).
Bank capital channel reveals itself clearly in the diagram. Compared with the impulse 
responses o f  the economy without bank capital channel, the decline o f  output, investment, 
capital, asset price are all more significant in the economy with banks’ balance sheet effect.
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The accelerator effect o f the bank capital channel works as follows. The economic recession 
triggered by the monetary contraction leads to large drop of asset price and rapid 
deterioration of entrepreneurial net wealth, even faster than the fall o f capital demand. Thus 
the entrepreneurs’ leverage ratio is still increasing after the onset of the negative shock. The 
increasing demand of external funds requires more issuance of bank equity, bidding up the 
average cost of banks’ loanable funds. This higher cost is passed to entrepreneurs through the 
banks who charge a higher price for the lending. As shown in the diagram, the EFP in the 
active bank capital channel economy increases several times more than that in the economy 
without active bank capital channel. Here the negative demand shock gives a downward 
pressure on price level that enlarges the real debt burden of the banks, which pass this higher 
burden to entrepreneurial sector again.
To summarize, an active bank capital channel amplifies and propagates the monetary policy 
shocks (demand shock) while attenuates and dampens the technology shocks (supply shock) 
when households’ deposit is contracted in nominal term. This result stems from the so called 
‘Fisher deflation effect’ channel initiated by Fisher (1933). The Fisher and bank capital effect 
mechanisms reinforce each other in the case of shocks that move the price level and output in 
the same direction (demand shock), and they tend to cancel each other in the wake of shocks 
which move the price level and output in opposite directions (supply shock). As shown in 
Christiano et al. (2010), the Fisher deflation effect is an additional source of nominal rigidity 
in the economy.
3.5.3 An experiment of Credit Crunch
Past evidences show a record of occasional but large direct shocks to banks’ balance sheets. 
Such shocks can deliver an immediate impact to the value of bank capital, and thus the price 
of bank shares. A notable example is the recent upheavals in financial markets worldwide, 
characterized by growing loan loss provisions, large asset writedowns and dramatic reduction 
in profits of financial institutions. The recognition of the banking sector’s inability to recover 
the principal from non-performing loans implies that the banking sector was not as 
productive as balance sheets had previously indicated. This would likely trigger a permanent
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Fig. 3.3 Impulse responses to a 'Credit Crunch' experiment
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fall in the value o f bank capital via a fall in the price o f bank shares. I now consider the 
effects o f financial shocks interpreted as a ‘Credit Crunch’ that lead to deep and permanent 
declines in bank capital value. The economy’s impulse responses are simulated for an initial 
fall in the price o f bank equity o f 5%, the magnitude o f which is to resemble the recent 
financial distress episodes.66 We can capture the effects o f ‘Credit Crunch’ experiment by 
assuming that the bank capital price is subject to episodes o f exogenous permanent decline.I
In this context, the bank capital price evolution equation defined in (3.9L) becomes
E A h  =  PqA ]  ~ E A;
66 This value is also used in Markovic (2006) and Meh and Moran (2010).
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Where dq* represents the deterioration of bank capital value and follows an exogenous AR(1) 
process. A positive permanent shock to dqzt thus decreases the bank capital price and leads to 
exogenous permanent declines in the bank capital value.
Figure 3.3 depicts the effects of such a shock, with previous assumed 5% initial fall. Since 
the shock is assumed to be nearly permanent, we can see the shock reach the trough of over 
20% lower than steady state value. The large deterioration of bank capital value resembles a 
negative shock to loan supply through the loan production function. Loan volume declines 
persistently along with the aggregate investment, physical capital demand, and asset price. 
Expecting the bank capital value stay low for long time, households switch from bank equity 
to deposit, driving down the return on deposit and enlarging the liquidity premium. The 
increase of liquidity premium overturns the decline of bank capital ratio, pushing up the 
banks’ intermediation cost and EFP. Entrepreneurial net wealth falls along with output. The 
economic recession created by the persistent decline in bank capital value is clearly seen from 
the diagram. On the other hand, aggregate consumption increases after the shock, resembling 
the results occur after a negative investment-specific technology shocks as in Fisher (2006). 
Finally, the shock induces slight inflationary pressures and in reaction, the interest rate 
increases gradually.
3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I provide a framework to incorporate the bank capital into financial friction 
analysis. Bank capital is important because it is assumed to be one of the three factors to 
produce entrepreneurial loans. In consequence, the financial friction is shown to depend on 
the corporate balance sheet condition, the bank capital ratio, and the liquidity premium. The 
former one follows the claim from the previous chapters that holding of collateral help 
mitigate the entrepreneurs’ payment for the cost associated with loan management. The latter 
two stem from the role of bank capital in loan production as well as in the transmission 
mechanism. Given that the banks liability composition is constant, the higher is the liquidity 
premium, the larger is the EFP. Similarly, given that the liquidity premium is constant, EFP is 
larger when higher proportion of loans is produced or financed with bank capital.
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Based on this framework, we are able to establish the link between the bank capital chan-nel 
and the model’s transmission mechanism subject to exogenous shocks. To this end, the main 
findings can be summarized as follows. An active bank capital channel amplifies and 
propagates the monetary policy shocks (demand shock) while attenuates and dampens the 
technology shocks (supply shock) when households’ deposit is contracted in nominal term. 
This result is ascribed to the ‘Fisher deflation effect’, which states that the real debt burden is 
related to the economy-wide inflation. The Fisher and the bank capital effect mechanisms 
reinforce each other in the case of shocks that move the price level and output in the same 
direction (demand shock), and they tend to cancel each other in the wake of shocks which 
move the price level and output in opposite directions (supply shock). On the other hand, it is 
shown that adverse financial shocks originating from the banking sector, which cause 
persistent declines of bank capital value, can lead to sizeable declines in bank lending and 
economic recession.
The current model is a primitive attempt and only considers the market discipline for bank 
capital requirements. Thus in future research, adding explicit regulatory requirements into 
this framework would enrich the analysis and possibly affect the business cycle properties of 
the capital adequacy ratio. It should be interesting to see how the interaction between 
regulatory discipline and market force of bank capital requirements influence the financial 
friction and the economic transmission mechanism as a whole.
Appendices
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Appendix A: Appendix to chapter 1
A .l Proof of proposition 1.1
Given the equation of external finance premium expressed in steady state
i_ 
l -r
E F P - U — F w ( l  - )
1 - y QK (Al)
The first and second derivatives of EFP with respect to net worth capital ratio are
_  2 y - l
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1 „  <-rF  w y
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;(A3)
It is easy to verify that the first order derivative comes out with negative sign while the 
second order derivative is positive, so prove the proposition.
A.2 Proof of proposition 1.2
Given the elasticity of EFP with respect to net worth capital ratio expressed as
Elasticity = EFP - 1
EFP
y N W / K  y  N W /K
1 - y N W / K  l - y l - N W / K (A4)
We fix the value of EFP and NW/K to their conventional steady state values. The first order 
partial derivative of elasticity with respect to y  is given by
dElasticity EFP NW
dy
1
+
1
EFP- 1 K  (1 - y N W / K ) 1 (1 -  NW/K)(\ -  y) ] > 0; (A5)
And the second order derivative is
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d2Elasticity _ EFP NW ..NW 1 1 , > ^
dy2 " E F P -I  K  K  (1 - y NW/ Kf  + (1 - N W /K)( \ -  y)3 ;
Both of the first and second order partial derivatives of the elasticity with respect to y  are 
positive, ensuring the upward sloping and convex function.
A.3 BGG’s financial contract
In this section of the appendix, I describe the derivation of the standard debt contract problem 
between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries (FIs) in a parsimonious fashion, where 
asymmetric information and costly state verification are the key elements. The derivation is 
divided into two steps: (1) the optimal contract in the non-stochastic steady-state, where 
aggregate risk is absent; (2) the log-linear form of the key financial friction equation around 
the steady-state.
Let NW  denote the steady-state level of entrepreneurial net worth, Q the price of capital 
(equal to one in steady state) and K  the steady-state level of the capital stock. The entre­
preneur borrows Q K - N W  to purchase K  units of capital in the production. Also let R k 
denote the steady-state gross rate of return on capital investment and co an idiosyncratic 
shock on the capital return for each individual entrepreneur. Thus the return on a specific 
project is (oRk . Following BGG and others, co is assumed to follow lognormal distribution
i.e. ln(®)~ iv(-0.5cr^,cr^). The realized payoff on the entrepreneur’s capital is coRkQ K . 
Note that co is unknown to both the entrepreneur and the FI prior to the investment decision. 
Even after the realization of the idiosyncratic shock, the FI can only observe co by paying a 
proportionate monitoring cost, jucoRkQ K . FIs are assumed to be break-even in equilibrium 
and are able to perfectly diversify idiosyncratic credit risk. Accordingly, their opportunity 
cost is the interest rate on deposit, Rd = 1//3.
The optimal contract specifies a cutoff value co such that if co > co , the entrepreneur pays the 
lender a fixed amount coRkQK  and keeps the remaining equity (co -  co)RkQ K . Alternatively, 
if co < co , the entrepreneur receives nothing, while the FI monitors the entrepreneur and 
receives (1 -ju)coRkQK in residual claims net of monitoring costs. In equilibrium, the FI 
earns an expected return equal to the deposit return implying
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a^ _ f(o ))d a + ^  cof(co)dco -  a>f(&)dco)RkQK = Rd(Q K -N ) ■ (A7)
The optimal contract maximizes the payoff to the entrepreneur subject to Eq. (A7). Given 
constant returns to scale, the cutoff value co determines the division of expected gross payoff,
RkQK,  between the entrepreneur and the FI. Let r(a?) = j j  cof {co)dco+57JT /(co)dco denote
  +co
the gross share of the payoff going to the FI, while /jG{cd) = /li\ cof (co)dco denotes theJO
expected share pertaining to monitoring costs. The payoff share going to the entrepreneur is 
thus given by 1 -  r(fiJ). Defining k = Q K / N  and s = R k/ R d , we can set up the Lagrangian 
as:
L = (l-r(fiT))y£+A[(r(a)-pG(m))sk-(k-l)];
The following optimality conditions are obtained:
: T \m )-2iT \c5)-fJ^\c5)\ = 0;
k: [a -r (© )) + A (r(® )-/iG (© ))>-A  = 0;
X: \T{c5)-jJZifd^sk-k+^O -
Rearranging gives
S^ ~  1 -  r(a ) + X{T(a ) -  /jG{co )) ’ ^
and
where the Lagrange multiplier X is now also defined as a function of co , by virtue of the first 
optimality condition noted above: X(jco) = r'(«)/(r'(<5y) -  juG'(co)) • BGG has shown that both 
s'ifo) > 0 and k'(co) > 0. This ensures the existence of a relationship
k  = ^ ( s ) ,  with ¥ '( * ) > ( ) ;  (A 10)
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that links the EFP, s , to the ratio between capital and entrepreneurial net worth, k . This 
relationship is the key feature of the financial accelerator.
To determine co , I proceed as follows. The steady-state net worth, as shown in Eq. (1.22) is 
given by
NW = u(l -  T(c5 ))RkQK + (1 -  v)S ;
Divide the above equation by RdQK  and rearrange, we get
P/k{a)  = u(l -  r(cJ)>(cJ) + (1 -  u) 5/icT; (All)
Thus co can be determined for given values of {/?,//, v ,c r l,S /K }67.
All derivations above pertain to the non-stochastic steady-state of the model. BGG also 
establish that, with the addition o f aggregate uncertainty, a positive relationship between the 
external finance premium and the capital to net worth ratio continues to hold. Specifically, 
following Eq. (A 10), this relationship can be written as
Q ,K t+1
NWm
(  1?T>k \  
+1e ,r; (A12)
Eq. (A12) provides a link between the entrepreneur’s demand for physical capital relative to 
his current net worth and the wedge between the expected return to capital and the deposit 
rate. The log-linear form of Eq. (A 12) shows
K / N ( q ,  +  kl+l - mv,+l) = W'{Rk/ R d)Rk/ R d E,(r,*+1 - £ , ) ; (A13)
or
EFPm ~1 =  E ,(rk+l -  ff+l) = -y/(nw,+l- q ,  -  kl+l) ; (A14)
with y/= .
W ( R k/ R ‘* )R {/ R d
Eq. (A 14) corresponds to Eq. (1.11L’) in the main text.
67 S /K  resembles the wage earned by entrepreneurs assumed in BGG and can be fixed in steady-state 
accordingly, see the appendix in Meier and Muller (2006).
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A.4 Steady state system
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Appendix B: Appendix to chapter 2
B.l Data description
Data are expressed in per-capita terms using population over 16 (expressed in billions) in 
quarterly base.
GDP, Yt : Gross Domestic Product, in billions of dollars, deflated by the Implicit Price 
Deflator of GDP. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Consumption, C, : Personal Consumption Expenditures (non-durables plus services), in 
billions of dollars, deflated by the Implicit Price Deflator of GDP. Source: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.
Investment, /,: Private Fixed Investment, in billions of dollars, deflated by the Implicit Price 
Deflator of GDP. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Inflation, nt : first difference of the log of the Implicit Price Deflator o f GDP. Source: Bureau 
of Economic Analysis.
Real wage, wt : Real Average Hourly Compensation for nonfarm business sector. Source: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Wage inflation, co,: first difference of the log of the Average Hourly Compensation for 
nonfarm business sector. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Capital, Kt : quarterly series is constructed using annual capital stock data and quarterly data 
on investment expenditure. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Tobin’s q, Qt : constructed using Eq. (2.18L) and the data on investment and capital.
Net worth, NWt : nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business net worth (market value) taken 
from the flow of funds account.
Mohey, M jP t : Real per capita M l.
Nominal interest rate, R" : 3-month average of the daily effective federal funds rate. Source: 
Federal Reserve System.
Hours worked, iVf: nonfarm business sector index, hours of all persons. Source: Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.
Banking hours, N* : product of two series: average weekly hours of production workers and 
production workers, thousands in the financial sector. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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